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ABSTRACT 
The Idea of ‘Holy Islamic Empire’ as a Catalyst to Muslims’ Response to the Second Crusade 
by  
Emeel S. Lamey 
 
The oral traditions in the Islamic world presented only the moral benefits of Jihad.  Yet, the fact 
is that, though the moral benefits continued to exist before and after the First Crusade, though the 
interest seemed to have been present and the necessary intellectual theories continued on, 
Muslims did not advance the practical Jihad.  Nonetheless, the disastrous Second Crusade struck 
a powerful chord among Muslims.  It forced Muslims to battle for their very survival, and to do 
so they would have to adapt, but equally they could only survive by drawing on their imperial 
inheritance built up over centuries.  A number of concerns identified with the “golden age” of the 
Islamic empire influenced the Jihad movements for Muslims associated the imperial traditions 
with Islam itself.  Given the examples of the First and Second Crusades, this study proposes that 
the idea of “Islamic Empire” constituted Muslims’ practical response to the crusades.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The impact and repercussions of the First Crusade unleashed brutal and harsh conditions 
on Muslims.  Just as no other crusade was as victorious as this one, so too the Islamic world felt 
its effects more profoundly than any other crusading campaign.  Notwithstanding the loss of 
Jerusalem and the Holy Land, and despite the campaign’s brutality, Muslims accustomed 
themselves to the crusader presence in their lands.  It is clear that although the Second Crusade 
was to follow, it did not result in any territorial losses or in any major damage to the Islamic 
world.  In outcome, although the impact of the triumphant First Crusade imposed harsher 
conditions on Muslims that should have provoked Muslims to embrace the holy war concept of 
Jihad, it was the impact of the fiascoes of the Second Crusade that struck a powerful chord to the 
forces of Islam.  Scholars tend to credit the suitable environment of retaking Jerusalem to the 
activities of Nur-ad-Din.  Although vital, Nur-ad-Din’s success lay in the newly interconnected 
practical and theoretical aspects of Jihad brought about by a new sense of pan-Islamism.  This 
new sense was the direct result to the outcome of the Second Crusade revitalizing Muslims’ 
nostalgia of ‘Holy Islamic Empire.’  In the case of both the First and Second Crusades, Muslim 
juries provided religious theories to justify Jihad as a counter-response.  Nonetheless, the impact 
of the Second Crusade encouraged Muslims of all social classes to unite their efforts under the 
state’s authority.  This step, coupled with aspirations to bring back the ‘Mighty Islamic Empire’, 
brought about the practicality to the Jihad.  
 The Second Crusade has fared poorly by contrast to the legendary First Crusade, which 
succeeded in taking Jerusalem from the Muslims and the thrilling Third Crusade, which was 
  6 
dominated by the heroics of Richard the Loinheart and Saladin.  The facts – that the First 
Crusade conquered Jerusalem and that the Third Crusade made wide progress in the recovery of 
the Holy Land – encouraged chroniclers to focus on these two campaigns.  By comparison, due 
to the failure of the Second Crusade, narrative western chroniclers poorly served it.  It seemed 
that chroniclers had no interest in recording the events of such a failure, with the exception of 
Otto of Freising’s and Odo of Deuil’s accounts.  By contrast, Muslim’s triumph in the Second 
Crusade encouraged chroniclers like Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Qalinisi to record the events of their 
success.  Although the Second Crusade obtained less attention than the First and the Third 
Crusades, it marked significant developments in the organization of the crusades.  For example, 
it was the first time that two European monarchs left their kingdoms and carried the cross toward 
the Holy Land.  The Second Crusade witnessed also the issue of Quantum Praedecessores, 
which represented the most organized papal authorization of preaching the crusade. 
 The study of the holy war, in general, and its history appears to be in vigorous condition; 
numerous work, both academic and popular, are published each year and there is an ongoing and 
energetic debate concerning the extent and the definitions of ‘crusading’ and ‘counter-
crusading.’  These studies are, after all, of direct relevance to a clearer understanding of the long-
term perception of the holy war and they shed light on the relationship between the Islamic world 
and the West.  This point, more decisively, indicates that political and ideological ethics 
concerning the holy war influenced scholars’ approaches, above all, the legitimacy of using force 
to promote even worthy and legitimate causes.   
  7 
From 1095 until the fourteenth century, scholars took an intrinsicist
1
 approach to the 
phenomenon of crusading and counter-crusading.  The constant tensions, threats, and religious 
fervor between western Christendom and the Islamic world influenced scholars’ interest in 
promoting worthy and legitimate causes for the war.  This approach criticizes the issue of the 
war from the viewpoint that there are certain acts that are good or bad in themselves, regardless 
of the consequences of these acts.  Scholars who took this approach confirm the issue of jus ad 
bellum that war must have a just cause, legitimate authority and righteous intentions, in order to 
be moral, though each one chose a one-sided viewpoint concerning the issue of war morality.
2
  
Although written from different viewpoints and offered varying terminology and biblical 
passages, almost all Latin historians and chroniclers of the expeditions that were later called the 
First and Second Crusades considered them legitimate holy responses to the Muslim or the so-
called infidels’ threat to Christian holy places.3  On the other hand, almost all Muslim historians 
                                                        
 The author translated documents in foreign languages into English. 
1
 The philosophical definition ‘intrinsic’ points to a semiconductor in which the 
concentration of charge-carriers is characteristic of the material itself regardless of any content of 
impurities it contains.  
 
2
 On the Just war theory in medieval western Christendom, see Thomas Aquianos, 
Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Vol. II, III vols. (New 
York: Benziger Brothers), Question 40; John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the Theory of 
Just War (New York: Continuum, 2006); On Just War theory in medieval Islam see John Kelsay, 
Arguing the Just War in Islam (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 97-124; John 
Kelsay, "Religion, Morality, and the Governance of War: The Case of Classical Islam," Journal 
of Religious Ethics 18, no. 2 (1990): 123-139.  
 3 For ideas of Latin chroniclers and the ways they used to justify the act of using force 
against Muslims see Jonathan Riley-Smith, What were The Crusades?, 3rd (Bloomington, IN: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 12-37; C. Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of Crusade, trans. M. 
Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 8, 349; J. Flori, 
"Guerre sainte et rètributions spirituelles dans la 2e moitiè du XIe siècle," Revue d'histoire 
ecclèsiastique 85 (1990): 627-628; For examples of scholars attitude toward war against 
Muslims in the fourteenth-century see Don Juan Manuel, Libro de los estados, ed. R. B. Tate and 
I. R. MacPherson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 53; V. Cantarino, "the Spanish 
Reconquest: A Clunic Holy War Against Islam?," in Islam and Medieval West: Aspects of 
Intercultural Relations, ed. K. I. Semaan (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1980), 98.  
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and chroniclers viewed the crusades as an act of evil, although written from different viewpoints 
and for distinctive interests.  While Latin scholars denied Muslims’ legitimacy of using force, 
Muslim scholars elevated the act of war against the so-called polytheists’ encroachments to the 
level of holy duties against evil.
4
  There is no doubt that both sides questioned the applications of 
war morality, although each side was concerned by the illegitimacy in the act of the opposite 
one, thus each side brought different ideologies to justify the legitimacy of its own war. 
 In the fifteenth-century, Muslims – specifically the Ottoman Turks – were a continuing 
threat to Western Europe and the defense of Christendom was seen as a pressing concern in the 
west.  The fall of Byzantium in 1453, in addition to the continued expansions of the Turks at the 
expense of the purported Christian lands, influenced the constancy of the intrinsicist approaches 
in humanists’ rhetoric.  Literally, humanists regarded the illegitimacy in the Muslim Turks’ act 
of war, thus they deliberated the legitimacy of Europeans using force in the form of a crusade 
against Muslims.  Remarkably, secular discussions of culture and politics supplemented 
humanists' visions.  This is not to imply that humanists rejected the religious rhetoric of the holy 
war completely.  Given the Greek and Roman foundations, humanists addressed the topic of the 
Turks and crusade in classical terms.  Rather than using the language of religion or chivalry, 
humanists justified European armed responses to the Turks’ threat by drawing a new image of 
Muslims in the form of replicas of the ancient barbarians, nomadic and destructive hordes upon 
great civilizations only to destroy their western cultures.  Like in ancient Rome, this image 
                                                        
 
4
 See Ibn al-Athir referring to the Crusades as a form of Christian holy war aimed at 
Islam and urging a Muslim counter-crusade in Ibn al-Athir, The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir for 
The Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi'l-Taa'rikh, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. 1, III vols. 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 13; see al-Sulami urging Muslims to 
elevate the concept of Jihad to the distruction of the polytheists (in referring to Crusaders) 
Emmanuel Sivan, "La genese de la contre-croisade," Journal Asiatique (La Societe Asiatique) 
254 (1966): 199-204. 
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justified not only using force to promote legitimate reasons, or even denying Muslims’ 
legitimacy in response, but also added a secular task on the crusade as a mission aimed at 
civilizing the barbarians.
5
 
 The Ottoman Turks, for their side, tended to move into the glorious past of the Islamic 
empire.  From their perspective, the Ottomans aimed their counter-crusading propagandas at 
gaining solid ground of legitimate authority in the Muslim world, thus they tried to fit their 
struggle against Europeans in the image of that of Saladin or the Great Caliphs as defenders of 
Islam.  They mobilized religious sentiments to their political expansion on the European 
continent, a holy mission against the crusades that transformed their status in the Muslim world 
from gazis ‘conquerors’ into mujahedeen ‘holy warriors.’  However, this came at a high cost on 
the Islamic world.  During their struggle with western Christendom, and since Selim the 
Conqueror occupied Arab lands, the Arab world suffered from an extreme neglect.  The Ottoman 
rule enforced a steady and general decline on Arab societies, a policy to protect their territories 
from future crusades.  The result of this isolationism was extremely harmful to the Muslim 
world.  Denied interactions with the outside world, the Middle East lacked the developing and 
                                                        
 
5
 For examples of humanists’ perception of the Ottoman Turks see Leonardo Bruni, The 
Humanism of Leonardo Bruni, trans. and ed. Gordon Griffith, James Hankins and David 
Thompson (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Society of America , 1987), 183; For 
Western reaction to the fall of Constantinople see Robert Schwoebel, The Shadow of the 
Crescent: The renaissance Image of The Turks 1453-1517 (NewYork: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 
chapter 1, 164-165; For humanist writing on crusade and the Turks see James Hankins, 
"Rensaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mohmed II," Dumberton 
Oaks papers 49 (1995): 111-207; see also Norman Housley, The Later Crusades, 1274- 1580: 
From Lyons to Alcazar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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the production of scholarship.  Consequently, Middle Eastern studies on the Crusades suffered a 
standstill from the fifteenth-century down until the first light of the twentieth-century.
6
 
 Between the sixteenth and the seventieth centuries, Europe witnessed scholars’ constancy 
in using the intrinsicist approaches toward the applications of war morality.  During the 
Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and down into the Civil War in England the issue turned 
into fierce controversies between Protestant and Catholic.  While Catholics viewed the issue of 
the crusades as a force for good, Protestants regarded Catholic crusades as the evil arm of the 
papacy.  They argued that the papacy had no legitimate authority to issue such a war.  In return, 
Protestants branded Catholic wars as an immoral reaction to humanity.  Although this argument 
would consider Muslims’ legitimacy of using force against such illegitimate war, Protestants 
used some rhetoric polemics against the Turks.  Protestants approached the issue of the war 
morality from their own side only.  They saw themselves as soldiers of Christ fighting a holy, 
just, and legitimate war in defense of Christianity against the forces of evil, regardless of the 
consequences.  As a result, each side promoted only its own use of force and denied the 
opposites’ legitimacy of using force.7   
                                                        
 
6
 Stanford Jay Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 1 (New 
York: cambridge University Press, 1976), 55-111; Stephen Turnbull, The Ottoman Empire, 
1326- 1699 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing LTD, 2003), 22-67; Jane Hathaway and Karl K. Barber, 
The Arab Land Under Ottoman rule, 1516- 1800 (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan, 
2008); see also Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
Inc., 1993), 72-84. 
 
7
 For Catholic and Protestant ideologies of each legitimacy of using force see P. Rousset, 
"L' idèologie de croisade dans les guerres de religion au XVIe siècle," SZG 31 (1981): 174-184; 
For an example of a Protostant scholar writing strongly anti-Catholic and anti-Turks see J. E. 
Baily, The Life of Thomas Fuller D. D. (Manchester , London: Unwin Brothers Printers, 1874), 
173-181; For Catholic defense of crusading ideology see E. A. R. Brown, "A Sixteenth-Century 
Defense of Saint Louis' Crusades: Etienne le Blanc and the Legacy of Louis IX," in Cross 
Cultural Convergences in the Crusader Period: Essays Presented To Aryeh Grabois on His 
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 Nonetheless, the end of the seventieth-century witnessed the impact of a wave of 
secularism on European societies.  This marked a new phase in western scholars’ approach 
toward the applications of morality in wars, especially, religiously ones.  For the first time, 
scholars started to observe the issue of religious violence as a part of history, which needs to be 
perceived, rather than a part of the history, which they live.  It seems that the decline of 
Ottomans’ threat brought about a state of self-confidence and ended the condition of perceiving 
the issue of Muslim responses under the hazard.  In outcome, the age of secularism overlapped 
the age of religious violence.  In return, new skeptic approaches overlapped the old intrinsic 
ones.  Skeptical scholars would rather not engage in the quest of war morality.  Thus, they prefer 
to use primary sources, but without any further interpretation to the events.  Their doubts in the 
bellum itself brought a notion of disbelieving in any applications of morality or justification in 
wars.  In return, their studies either favored to show sympathies to all victims of war or avoided 
engaging in the issue.  For example, Thomas Fuller published an anti-Catholic Historie de 
croisade in 1670.  In this publication Fuller provides a trace of a new skeptical attitude of 
perceiving the past, but with a tendency and favor toward his Christian ‘Protestant’ identity, 
which points to the intrinsicist approach.  Meanwhile, his hesitation and enthusiasm toward the 
applications of violence in both sides confirms the new skeptical approach.  Thus, it would be 
true to say that although Fuller’s study tended to view Muslims as victims of crusaders’ greed, 
his religious zeal denied Muslims’ right to use force in respond to the crusades.8 
 In the eighteenth-century, a number of events had turned in Europe, which marked a new 
tide of scholarly opinions.  The total decline of the Ottoman Empire marked the end of the so-
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Sixty-fifth Birthday, ed. M. Goodich, S. Menache and S. Schein, (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 1995), 21-48. 
 
8
 Heinrich Von Sybel, The History and Literature of the Crusades, trans. L. D. Gordon 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1861), 163-164.      
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called Muslims’ threat to Europe.  In retrospect, rationalist writers brought about a gradual shift 
into more liberal thinking in the age of enlightenment.  They tended to view the war as immoral, 
worldly motivated enterprises, and inspired by religious zeal.  At this stage, scholars doubted the 
existence of any form of morality or justifications in a war.  In return, doubts in the legitimacy of 
using force fueled scholars’ skeptical approaches.  For example, in 1751, Voltaire commented on 
the crusades, “[the crusades were] the thirst for brigandage.”9  Gibbon, as well, called the 
crusades, “savage fanaticism.”10  In addition, the impact of the French revolution ideals 
influenced enlightenment scholars to associate the use of force with the illegitimate tyrannical 
authority.
11
  Certainly, this idea applies not only on the crusades but also on Muslims’ counter-
crusades.       
 By this time the industrial revolution had widened the technological gap between 
Western Europe and the rest of the world, including the Middle East.  This gap ushered in the 
late eighteenth-century and continued toward the early nineteenth-century, in which a new era of 
European colonization occurred.  Influenced by secular ideals and a great enthusiasm toward 
medieval literature, rationalists and romanticists, secularly, associated the age of European 
colonization with the age of the crusades.  In response, the memories of the crusades brought a 
sympathetic attitude toward the Middle East, yet in skeptical approaches.  Instead of engaging 
into the argument of war morality, rationalists favored the depictions of the war in romantic 
literature, art, and music.  In return, speaking of the crusades, romanticists and rationalists drew a 
                                                        
 
9
 Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, in Oeuvres complète de Voltaire, ed. L. Moland, Vol. 54 
(Paris: Garnier Frères, 1877-1885) 11:442. 
 
10
 E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. D. 
Womersley (London, 1994), chp. 61: 3:727. 
 
11
 See Emerson comments in his journal that the crusades took their place among the 
monuments of folly and tyranny in W. Gilman and A. Ferguson ed., The Journals and 
Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson 1826-1900, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1963), 18.  
  13 
fantasy image of sympathies toward all war victims and heroes, especially Muslims, as 
rationalists considered Muslims, victims of the Crusaders’ fanaticism, although rationalists 
placed no reference toward the rights of a victim to respond to aggressors.  The best example of 
which sympathies toward the Middle East is seen in the novel of Sir Walter Scott, The Talisman, 
in which he described the piety and heroics of Saladin.
12
           
   In the early nineteenth-century, western studies started to consider the importance of 
Muslim accounts of the crusades, although these studies treated Muslim’s accounts with a 
skeptical attitude.  The publication of The Recuiel des historien des croisade struck a more 
serious scholarly note.  This publication includes editions of primary sources in Latin, Greek, 
and most importantly, Arabic entitled Le Livre Des Deux Jardins, Histoire Des Deux Regnes, 
Celui De Nour Ed-Din Et Celui De Salah Ed-Din.
13
  Although the study considered the 
importance of Muslim sources, it did not provide any further interpretation to the Islamic 
perspective of the crusade.  No wonder, the major body of the early studies of the Muslim’s part 
of the crusades tended to aim at the broad aspect of Saladin’s part in Muslims’ counter-
crusading.  The influence of rationalists – in addition to the heroics of Saladin and Richard the 
Lionheart during the Third Crusade – encouraged scholars to focus on Saladin’s role of returning 
Jerusalem to the Muslims.  
                                                        
 
12
 Sir Walter Scott, The Talisman, ed. Dwight Holbrook (Boston: Ginn & Company 
Publishers, 1895); for more evidances of rationals’ sympathies toward the medieval lierature and 
the Middle East see J. Dakyns, The Middle Ages in French Literature, 1851-1900 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), 1-28; see Gibbon and Mohammed in Bernard Lewis, Islam and 
the West, 85-98. 
 
13
 Receuil, Des Historiens des Croisades, Historians orientaux, Vol. Tome V (Paris: Les 
Soins De L'Academie des Inscription et Belles-Littres, 1876); see also H. Deherain, “Les 
Orignes du recueil des Historiens des croisades,” JSav, n.s., 17 (1919): 260-266. 
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 As a result, toward the eve of the twentieth-century, Muslims’ perspective studies 
contributed more to the heroics of Saladin, yet still in skeptical attitude.  In 1907, W. B. 
Stevenson published, The Crusaders in the East.  In this study, Stevenson places his emphasis on 
the Muslims’ side at the age of the Crusades.  No wonder, Stevenson’s study aimed heavily at 
the heroics of Saladin as a part of Muslims’ reaction toward Crusaders’ existence in the East.  
Although Stevenson’s study attempted to use primary sources from both Europeans’ and 
Muslims’ sides, his study avoided emphasis to Muslims’ counter-crusade movements.  It seems 
that Stevenson’s sympathetic attitude toward the Middle East at the peak of Western colonization 
influenced his engagement in the quest of war morality, though his study avoided criticizing the 
war ideology neither that of crusading nor Muslim counter-crusading.
14
  
 Skeptical approaches continued further throughout the twentieth-century, some times in 
the shadow of the Marxists theory.  By which, scholars tended to evaluate Muslim’ response to 
the crusades from the viewpoint of whether (or not) the response represented a Muslim leader 
whose reaction to the crusades favored the needs of the poorer class or in favor of the greedy 
needs of the nobility class.  In 1967, N. Elisseeff published the best example of this approach.  
Elisseff wrote a three-volume monograph in French entitled, Nur-ad-Din: Un grand prince 
musulman de Syrie au temps des Croisades.  In this study, Elisseeff provides a biographical work 
of Nur-ad-Din.  Elisseff elevated the image of Nur-ad-Din from a Muslim warlord into the leader 
                                                        
 
14
 William. B. Stevenson, The Crusaders in the East: A Breif History of the Wars of Islam 
with the Latins of Syria during the twelfth and thirteenth centuaries (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1907; G. le Strange, Review of the Crusaders in the East by W. B. Stevenson, 
The English Historical Review (Oxford University Press) 23, no. 90 (Apr. 1908), 346-47. 
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who brought about the rights of the poor.  Yet, Elisseeff’s study did not offer a full assessment of 
the key figure of Muslims’ counter-crusade.15 
 Certainly, religion provides a strong psychological motivation for wars.  Human’s search 
for insurance from the mysterious future propels one to establish a good relationship with the 
superpower.  Above all, higher expectations of salvation fulfill human’s psychological need.  
The ideology of the holy war, in return, combines the practical act of war and aims it at earning 
the needed salvation.  By this ideology, an individual’s worldviews prevail that the act of 
fighting grants godly salvation.  The term ‘Jihad’ stands to explain this ideology in Islamic 
beliefs.  Therefore, utilitarian approaches that describe the holy war as one that starts with the 
premise of either ‘primarily spiritual’ or ‘primarily materialistic’ are over-simplifications.  The 
holy war was rather a combination of both.  Consequently, materialistic explanations – which 
were so influential in the 1950s – are less in evidence.  It was actually liberal economic 
historians, not Marxist, who preferred materialistic approaches to interpret the holy war, striped 
of its ethic, in social and economic terms.
16
  They believed that crusading – and obviously 
counter-crusading – was an early example of colonialism and assumed that economic forces 
could only motivate such powerful movements.  Ahead of the list, Joshua Prawer, for whom the 
portrayal of the Crusaders as forerunners of colonialism accorded with a Zionist reading of the 
history of the Promised Land since the Diaspora.
17
 
                                                        
 
15
 Nikita Elisseeff, Nur-ad-Din: Un grand prince musulman de Syrie at temps des 
Criosades (511 -569 A.H./1118-1174), III vols. (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damascus, 
1967). 
16
 Norman Housley, Contesting The Crusades (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 
77-78. 
17
 See summarize of Prawer’s approach in Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades, 
Chrestianity, and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 3-4, 60-61; Joshua 
  16 
 When it comes to broader trends of economic and social changes, the picture is a little 
murkier.  The argument that the prime causes for the practical crusading or Jihad were simply 
economic and that the prime motivating force was a desire for profit, or at least for an escape 
from dire financial circumstances, is vague.  Neither imperialism nor Marxism existed in the 
medieval world, at least in theories.  This might only account for the way critics of too much 
realism at the expense of avoiding engagements in the debate that religious ideal provides a 
strong motivation for the holy war.  What this leaves us with is the pre-eminence of religious 
beliefs and values.  One advantage of stressing the religious origins of crusading and counter-
crusading is that it occurs with the picture presented in the sources.  Yet, there is admittedly a 
danger in pursuing this line of argument of falling into the trap of assuming certain values are 
always necessarily paramount. 
For example, Emmanuel Sivan published his work L’Islam et La Croisade in 1968.  
Although his analysis provides the earliest most important work regarding Muslims’ counter-
crusading, he took a utilitarian approach.
18
  By this approach, Sivan tended to deal pragmatically 
with the issue of the war.  Sivan argues that the serious mobilization of Jihad as a Muslims’ 
instrument in the war against the Crusades began in the time of Zengi.
19
   Practically, Sivan’s 
argument holds strong, since Zengi’s move is considered the first Muslim functional response 
against the crusades.  However, Sivan’s analysis assumed that Zengi’s warfare against the 
crusades necessarily reflected religious values.  To be sure, the term Jihad demonstrates two 
interconnected concepts, holy and war.  The first of which, the concept ‘holy’ stands to explain 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Prawer, The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson Publishing, 1972). 
 
18
 Emmanuel Sivan, L'Islam et la Croisade: ideologic et propagande dans les reaction 
musulmanes aux Croisades (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1968). 
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the theoretical religious coating, which provides the psychological motivation for the general 
population to pick up the arms and be a part of the second, which is the practical worldly war.  It 
seems that Sivan dealt with the relationship between the theory and the practice of Jihad as two 
different spheres, rather than as one interacting and mutual sphere.   
 Not all scholars accept the idealistic defensive practices of a holy war, and many writers 
have pointed out the failure of historians to take accounts of psychological and sociological 
theories in studying the motivations of the holy war.  Psychologically, the ideology of a holy war 
stands as the way of resolving the tension, or endemic cognitive dissonance, between religious 
ideals and the worldly violence of medieval societies.
20
  This ideology combines the theology of 
salvation with the practical action of the sword, by which it justifies the war and establishes the 
psychological needed good relation with the superpower (God).  In sociological outcome, this 
sort of integration required Muslim juries to provide logical theories, which offer salvation to 
those who decides to fight from the common people.  In return, the practical warfare side – 
brought about by the political authorities of the state  – takes a religious coating.  This step alters 
the movement from a secular and political war into a combination of holy and just war.  For 
example, the concept of Jihad at the time of the Crusades should have offered Muslims in 
general with the new reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight.  This 
alteration shifts the tiny individual movements into a mass movement because it meets a 
widespread psychological need.
21
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 The full, composite story of the holy war needs the drawing together of evidences from 
both sides of the conflict.  Due to the negative impact of isolation for almost five centuries under 
Ottoman rule, the Muslim world has approached the phenomenon of the Crusades less globally.
22
  
Once the Ottoman forces withdrew from the Middle East after their defeat in the First World 
War, the Middle East encountered European colonialism.  In return, a wave of religious fervor 
influenced Middle Eastern approaches toward the phenomenon of the crusades.  Western 
colonialism brought back to Muslims memories of massacres conducted by the crusades in the 
holy land, and the epic of endless battles with the crusaders.  In outcome, Middle Eastern studies 
tended to move into the past and treated the issue of the crusade as a holy bond between the 
present generation and their ancestors.  That explains why counter-crusading ideology remained 
consistence in the face of a new wave of crusading in referring to colonialists and imperialists.  
This attitude associated any form of modern western presence in the Middle East with the 
negative memories of the crusades.     
 That included affiliating the consequences of European colonialism, and the tension 
between western and Islamic societies, together with medieval crusading and counter-crusading 
propagandas.  After all, these ideas shaped the minds of Middle Eastern scholars, who in return 
took the intrinsicist approach in the studies of the Crusades. This approach diminished 
completely from western scholarships since the end of the seventeenth-century.  Fueled with 
rising religious fervor and nationalists’ identity, Middle Eastern scholars dealt with the crusades 
as an act of evil and justified all forms of Islamic response.  In 1972, the Syrian scholar Zakkar 
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published a two-part work in Arabic entitled, the Crusading wars (al-Hurub al-Salibiyya).
23
  
Rather than a scholarly work, the study provides an anachronistic nationalist viewpoint.  It 
evaluated Muslims’ counter-crusading phenomenon in the light of recent Middle-Eastern 
experiences, as far as Arab nationalism, the establishment of the State of Israel, the liberation of 
Palestine and the rise of the Islamic fundamentalism.  Zakkar’s study brought about the 
legitimacy of Muslims response to modern western encroachment, which he referred to by the 
definition, ‘Crusade.’ 
 Down into the late twentieth century in the Middle East, the rise of political Islamism – 
and the ideologies of justifying acts of extreme violence has on it the stamp of the early Middle 
Eastern twentieth century’ association of crusading ideas and imperialism – has left a wary 
impact on Middle Eastern scholars of the crusades, perhaps until today.  The spread of political 
Islamist’s ideas raised an issue of suspicion in the Middle East.  In retrospect, Middle Eastern 
scholars tended to avoid criticizing Muslims’ response to the crusades because Islamists were 
likely to view any balanced study as an act of supporting western ideals, which they labeled as a 
crusade aimed at the destruction of Islamic ideals.
24
  This, in return, brought about the skeptical 
approaches to Middle Eastern scholars who contributed to the topic in later time.  Not long after 
Zukkar’s study, in 1984, Amin Maalouf published another Middle-Eastern approach of the 
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Crusades entitled, The Crusades through Arab Eyes.
25
  Unfortunately, Maalouf’s study lives up 
to its title, although it depends heavily on major Arabic sources, it contains a drawback of a 
general narrative to Muslims’ counter-crusading movements but without furnishing new 
information or even new interpretation.  Apparently, Maalouf’s experience of a sectarian war in 
Lebanon, in addition to fundamental Islamists’ suspicions influenced his doubts in the legitimacy 
of any form of war.  Therefore, his study avoids his personal judgment on Muslims’ counter-
crusades movements.
26
 
 Political and ideological concerns still influence interest in the crusades today, including 
the consequences of European colonialism, western imperialism, and East-West tensions.  Over 
the last two decades, western scholars well regarded the phenomenon of the crusades and its 
Muslim counter-crusades.  The major body of recent studies tended to look at the topic of the 
crusades and their Muslim counterpart with consequentlist approaches.  The rising tide of 
criticism influenced this approach.  Given the difficulty to understand the morality of wars from 
one viewpoint, consequentlist scholars aimed at criticizing the consequences, which led to the 
war, its results, all possible different arguments and interpretations related to it, and from both 
Muslim and Latin viewpoints.  Beginning from the late twentieth century, the extensive increase 
in the studies of the crusades has led historians who aimed heavily to focus on the Western 
perspectives of the Crusades to start considering the Muslims’ side.  
  In 1987, Riley-Smith published the first edition of The Crusade, A History.  In this 
publication, Riley-Smith explains the political trends of the impact of the First Crusade’s success 
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and the Second Crusade’s failure on both European Christians and on Muslims.  Riley-Smith 
noted the weak and divided Muslims’ response to the First Crusade.  Toward which, he 
emphasized that the success of the First Crusade depended on Muslims’ political division.  He 
also noted that the failure of the Second Crusade led to the growing power of Nur-ad-Din of 
Aleppo.  In addition, the failure placed Muslims morals in the highest level and showed how 
dangerous a united Muslim Syria could be.  Riley-Smith noticed that both crusaders and 
Muslims justified the use of force toward what they both considered a just war of liberation.
27
  
With a consequentlist approach, Riley-Smith’s study draws evidences from both Muslims and 
western perspectives to illuminate one another, and then places his own criticism on the image.
28
 
 The growing intellectual appetite for work on the crusades encouraged scholars to focus 
more on Muslims’ response to the crusades.  In 1999, Carole Hillenbrand published a textbook 
concerned only with the Islamic perspectives on the Crusades.  Hillenbrand’s study examined the 
impact of the First and Second Crusades on Muslims.  Rather than concerning with Muslims’ 
justifications of the war, Hillenbrand’s study provides an analysis to the causations and 
consequences of the counter-crusading movements.  Hillenbrand noticed the absence of 
Muslims’ political leadership at the eve of the First Crusades.  Even after the impact of the First 
                                                        
 
27
 Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades, A History, 2nd edition (New Haven, London: 
Yale University Press, 2005), 50-75, 121-136; see also Jonathan Riley-Smith, The First Crusade 
and The Idea of Crusading (Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennselvania, 2009) author’s 
introduction; For western studies concerened with the consequences of European colonialism, 
western imperialism, and East-West tensions on the phenomenon of the crusade see Jonathan 
Riley-Smith, The Crusades, Chrestianity, and Islam, 45-80.  
 
28
 For more western crusades’ specialists with a consequentlist’ approach toward 
Muslims’ response to the First and Second Crusades see Jonathan Phillips, The Second Crusade: 
Extending the Frontiers of Christendom, 270-279; Jonathan Phillips, Holy Warriors, A Modern 
History of The Crusades (New York: Random House Inc., 2009), 3-103; see Muslim revival in 
Christopher Tyerman, God's War: A New History of The Crusades (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 268- 72, 329-38; see the Zengid threat and the 
rise of Nur-ad-Din in Thomas Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2006), 49-71. 
  22 
Crusade, Hillenbrand proposed that all Muslim’s Jihad attempts seemed ill-assorted since freeing 
Jerusalem had no significance to such rulers in this period.
29
  Hillenbrand’s study of the Second 
Crusade proposes that, because of the Frankish siege of Damascus, the mood of Muslims within 
Damascus and thereafter elsewhere in Syria seems to have been changed, but without any further 
explanation to the incentives of that change.  Furthermore, Hillenbrand’s argument implies that 
the act of freeing Jerusalem represented the true Islamic Jihad at the age of the crusade.  This 
implication, however, assumed that the whole struggle between the act of crusading and that of 
Jihad revolved around Jerusalem.  In return, it fell short to explain such a plastic concept like the 
concept of Jihad, which can be deployed in many different ways, perspectives and for varying 
ends.
30
 
 From a Theological approach, the ideal theory of Islamic law succeeded to impose itself 
on Muslims’ practices of Jihad, which in return influenced Muslims response to the crusades in 
general, and to Second Crusade in particular.  Toward this trend, in 2001, Roy Mottahedeh and 
Ridwan al-Sayyid provided another Islamic specialist study with a consequentlist approach, since 
it aimed at understanding the causations and consequences of the theoretical field of Muslims’ 
jus in bellum.  The study concerns with the ideology of the holy war in the Islamic world before 
and during the impact of the Crusades.  Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid’s argument traces the 
different interpretations of Jihad in Islamic history, and the ways by which Muslim intellectuals 
treated the concept of Jihad.  This study in particular offered an insight to the political influence 
on Islamic Intellectuals’ interpretations of the term Jihad and its significances.  On the other 
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hand, the prime argument of the study proposes that the concept of Jihad as a holy and just war 
never seemed to be embraced entirely in practical terms during the Crusades.
31
  Mottahedeh and 
al-Sayyid noted that although the religious theories of Jihad existed before and after the impact 
of the Crusades, Muslims’ practical response came too short and far away from the holy war 
theories, which would have offered the psychological fuel for Muslims toward a wide counter-
Crusading movement.   
 By applying a sociological approach to Mottahedeh’s and al-Sayyid’s study, the study 
reveals an important aspect to the lack of Muslims’ response to the Crusades.  Apparently, the 
lack of Muslims’ response to the impact of the Crusades was the outcome of the separated 
spheres of Muslims’ social structure.  The ideology of the holy war, as mentioned before, 
combines the theological theory of salvation with the practical action of the sword, by which it 
provides the image of justice on the war and establishes the psychological needed good relation 
with the superpower (God).  This combination obliged a social integration amongst the religious 
class who provides the theories and the people who provides the practices: the political 
authorities, namely, the state and the general population.  Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid’s argument 
revealed that Muslim juries contributed and continued to contribute intellectual theories 
regardless of the material conditions of the Islamic world.  This meant that the theatrical field of 
Jihad witnessed no significant changes after the impact of the crusades.  What this leaves us with 
is the practical field of the holy war, and certainly enough, the relationship between the human 
institution of the state and its subjects.   
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After all, it seems that all the various aspects of crusading and counter-crusading, its 
religious theories, traditions, philosophies, literature and laws, has been roughly investigated 
toward a better understanding of its manifold manifestations.  There is, however one field that no 
substantial advances can yet be registered, and which remains greatly a terra incognita: a 
socioeconomic approach toward the ‘Holy War.’  Certainly, there is no direct connection 
between the two topics.  Moreover, this approach contradicts the oral tradition of events in the 
Islamic world for all chroniclers considered only the religious perspective of the movements.  In 
addition, there is relatively little consistency about what constituted the counter-crusading 
movements in the assortment of sources.  Therefore, pursuing the traditional line of arguments 
will surely indicate that religious values were always paramount.  However, the socioeconomic 
approach will reveal any transformation in the relationship between the state and its subjects.  
Above all, one major responsibility for the Islamic state was to consider both moral and material 
needs of its own subjects.  Consequently, the aim and the major theme of the present work are to 
shed the light on the transformations and the developments of the relationship between the 
Islamic state and its Muslim subjects, which determined the magnitude and the extent of 
Muslims’ practical warfare (Jihad).   
This is not to underestimate the pull of ideology.  The motives of Muslims’ response to 
the crusaders have long intrigued historians, and, self evidently, faith lies at the heart of holy 
war.  From a modern-day western perspective, extreme religious fervor is often synonymous 
with fanaticism, but in the Middle East, it was regarded as virtuous and positive at the age of 
crusading, because it provided a notion of godly legitimate domination and authority.  It was a 
society saturated with religious beliefs in which faith provided the template and the boundaries 
for almost every aspect of behavior, and where recognition of divine will and fear of the afterlife 
  25 
were universal.  The fight against the enemies of God offered everyone in general and lay-people 
in particular, a way to evade the torment of hell and this is the one reason why counter- 
crusading movements became a fundamental feature of medieval Islam and perhaps until 
today.
32
 
For the Muslim East, and to an extent, the Second Crusade provided no such harm if 
compared to the First Crusade.  Ironically, it struck a powerful chord with the forces of Islam.  
Muslims’ Jihad in itself was not a new thought, but the scale of the movement after the Second 
Crusade gave it unprecedented impetus.  Consequently, the psychological and sociological 
scopes of this study reflects a modern academic consensus on the duration and the extent of 
Muslims’ Jihad movements from the Omayyad period, the First Crusade, the decades after the 
conquest of Jerusalem in 1099, and until the death of Nur-ad-Din.  Nur-ad-Din’s success 
depended on a new sense of pan-Islamism: an uneasy truth between the Islamic state and its 
subjects that drove wider numbers of Muslims to join forces against the crusaders.  This new 
sense revived into the Muslim world in response to the Second Crusade.  In return, the extent of 
Muslims practical warfare against the crusades became extremely wide.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MYTH OF ‘HOLY ISLAMIC EMPIRE’ AND THE FIRST CRUSADE 
The Jihad seems to be the very epitome of the phrase ‘war of religion’ in Islam.  A duty 
provides Muslims with the fulfillment of their religious obligation.  The ideas of earning 
martyrdom and paradise strongly fed the motivation for Jihad.  Especially at the occasion of 
wars fought against unbelievers, the Holy Koran and the prophet’s hadiths extolled the merits of 
fighting a Jihad and described the rewards waiting in the afterworld for those killed during holy 
fighting.
33
  This strong psychological motive offered Muslims with the new reconciliation 
between the desire of salvation and the need to fight.  Toward this ideology, Muslim juries 
elaborated multiple logical theories of religious ideals aimed at providing a forceful motivation 
to all Muslims to be parts of a war.  The main philosophy of these theories aimed at altering the 
war from a secular and political war into a combination of holy and just war.  The main goal for 
such an amalgamation revolved around fulfilling the psychological need of the general 
population: the main force of all historical Islamic wars.  Certainly, the motives that propelled 
Muslims toward embracing Jihad in practical terms were multifarious.   
In the end, although war is a political means, the diversity of war goals determined 
distinctions in the motivations for each individual to be a part of a war.  Therefore, the abundant 
of motives led to the constancy of war brutality.  This step influenced Muslim legists to question 
the moral applications in such wars.  Muslim legists attempted to set a tradition of mutually 
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agreed procedures of combat, which included arrays of shared values among Muslims.  These 
values indicate the implicit (or the explicit) social agreement upon limits to their warfare.  The 
procedures outlined in most studies established a notion of war as a means of perusing goals 
considered legitimate.  The nature of these procedures made it clear that war is not the first or 
primary goal.  Legists prescribed fighting only when other means failed.  This indicates that 
resort to war must follow an attempt to pursue legitimate goals by nonlethal means.  
Consequently, the tradition of legists’ Sharia reasoning provided an equivalent theory to the just 
war criteria: legitimate authority, just cause, and righteous intentions.
34
  It is clear that this 
approach questioned the morality of the war in connection with broader issues of political ethics.  
Therefore, in the light of the just war theory, this chapter will attempt understanding the diverse 
interests, motives, and objects of Muslims’ perception of the First Crusade, which put them at 
odds with one another.  
In the just war thinking, the criterion of the legitimate authority serves a formal purpose 
in thinking about the use of lethal force.  Therefore, the Imam, which then meant much the same 
thing as the Caliph, the supreme ruler and head over the entire Muslim community and polity, 
had the ultimate responsibility for military operation.  It was his duty to call for Jihad, weighing 
its costs and benefits for the Muslims in any given circumstances, issues the summons and the 
declarations, which signals the presence of war.
35
  At the eve of the crusades, political 
distinctions concerning the legitimacy of the authority influenced Muslim legists’ interpretation 
to the concept of Jihad.  Although juries’ interpretations drew on the same sources, their theories 
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did not take shape in a vacuum but rather in the social and political atmospheres in which each 
interpretation grew and developed.  Thus, the divisions among Muslim’s juries concerning the 
term of Jihad appeared by its nature to be more of a social expression to the issues of legitimacy, 
justice, and necessity of such a war. 
For example, the two major Islamic legal schools of Jihad’s interpretation existed in the 
Islamic world at the eve of the First Crusade, the Maliki school of Hejaz
36
 and the Syrian School 
of al-Shafi.
37
  The Maliki School believed only in the defensive obligations of wars, and 
condemned every kind of aggressive war.  Literally, Malik was a political opposition to the 
Omayyad; hence, he enforced a theoretical approach that doubted the way by which the Syrian 
Omayyad Caliphs usurped power.
38
  In return, Malik raised the issue of the illegitimate authority 
of the Syrian Omayyad Caliphs.  Consequently, Malik denied the legitimacy of a Muslim 
offering his service in any border warfare led by the Omayyad’s Caliphs.39  There is no doubt 
that this approach manipulated a wide audience among Muslims’ general population, who tended 
to suspect the righteous intentions of their spiritual and political leadership.  In return, Malik’s 
audience viewed the deficiently of any wars that were led by the Omayyad Caliphs.  
Meanwhile, Syrian jurists reflected the determination to make progress on the Byzantine 
frontier in the first half of the second Islamic century.  Accordingly, the offensive approach of 
Jihad attracted Syrian jurists to support the legitimate authority of the Omayyad’s wars against 
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Byzantium.  Al-Shafi’s ideology presented the peak of the Syrian school’s interpretation of 
Jihad’s doctrine.  Al-Shafi’s version elevated the destruction of the atheism40 to be the primary 
justification of Jihad.
41
  Similar to al-Maliki, there is no doubt that this approach manipulated a 
wide audience among Muslims’ general population, who tended to consider the righteous 
intentions of their spiritual and political leadership and in response the war itself. 
Although theoretically divided, Muslims went to war almost every year during the 
Omayyad period, and for most of the period, the extent of Muslim citizens’ involvement in war 
was extremely wide.
42
  At which time, the proportionality of Muslims’ regular warfare grew out.  
The social ethos and above all the glory and good repute supported the Islamic expansions.  It 
seems that the Omayyad wars brought the different interests and motives of fairly all Muslims to 
a form of an agreement.  Indeed, the Omayyad’s expansions provided the Islamic world with 
reasonable defensive measures.  On the other hand, although offensive form of wars caused a 
theoretical disagreement among Muslims, the Omayyad wars reflected the sense of a dominating 
religion and its community.  That motivated the major body of Muslim general population to 
fight.  The last point reveals, more decisively, the low-upper limit of shared motivation in the 
Islamic expansions.  Thus, the emphasis on a system of social analysis with considerable 
psychological elements might bridge the gap between the war goals, social economics, and 
Muslims’ enthusiasm toward the war. 
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During the Omayyids, the military power locked economic growth to the Islamic State.  
The argument is dense, but it may be reasonably summarized in this way.  The Omayyad wars 
brought to the Muslim world extensive territorial expansion, in addition to accumulation of 
booty, both essential processes for the growth of wealth in the Islamic empire.  These expansions 
brought into the Islamic empire for the first time large traces of lands overlooking the 
Mediterranean with access to waterways trade, together with larger traces of inland territories 
with unlimited access to overland routes of trade and communication.  It increased the extent of 
agricultural territory within the Islamic state.  It boosted the Levy, the extent of serf-labors, self-
sufficiently on the large estates, peace and war and, more importantly, the changing role of the 
state with the development of the large territorial empires.  More decisively, the large territorial 
empire changed the definition of the term ‘Muslims’ from a label of a religious community to an 
actual label of a political and imperial unity.  This meant that the identity-term ‘Muslims’ 
became the badge of the empire and its dominating community.  In addition, psychologically, the 
military expansions were useful for all Muslims, since it represented a way of resolving the 
dissonance of a society at the expense of a foreign state.  This is not an exhaustive list, but it will 
suffice for later purposes in co-relating of bringing Jihad’s theory and practices together to 
functionality.
43
    
The growing extension of unlimited resources brought about a case of social welfare into 
the Islamic world, although ‘welfare’ is not an eighth-century concept.  For the army, the pay 
was mainly if not entirely to Muslim citizens.  A long season of expansion probably meant active 
campaigning, and this gave greater hopes of booty.
44
  The domination over trade routes created 
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an extensive mine for employment in commercial businesses.  The state assigned farmlands to its 
own subjects, especially from the poorer strata.  Christian and Jew inhabitants had to pay tributes 
(jizia).  This unlimited income financed more campaigns and brought into the empire more 
resources.  The Islamic state enjoyed strong and expanding urban networks, growing consumer 
demands, increasing range of manufacturing activities, and highly commercialized economy.  By 
this system, the state’s administrators although motivated by gaining wealth, they created much 
wealth, which they shared with their subjects.  More precisely, the institutions of the state 
manipulated the use of force for rational goals that benefited a whole community.  Therefore, 
rational production triggered the aims of power politics within the Islamic state.
45
  This is not to 
deny the religious perspective of the expansions.     
Certainly, economic motivation can also be a catalyst to religious motivation.  Based 
upon the Weberian theory, members of different social classes adapt different belief systems to 
explain their social situation.  If true, then the growth of wealth in the Islamic world replaced the 
wide-gap among Muslims by a majority of middle-class citizens.  This step indicates that 
Muslims, unequally, shared the economic privileges of a paramount citizenship, which the 
Islamic imperial expansions provided.  In retrospect, Muslims, unequally, supported the imperial 
wars and coated it with Jihad theories.  Weber proposed also that people understand themselves 
to be able to be in a right relationship with supernatural powers, by which prosperity echoes a 
blessing of God.  By applying this approach to the Islamic society, it suggests that Muslims, 
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regardless of their social class, viewed the act of war – which brought wealth for everyone within 
the Islamic empire – as an act that created a good relationship with God.  This, in return, granted 
the psychological needed salvation.  Furthermore, this development provided the senses of the 
legitimate causation and righteous intentions on the act of fighting.  Consequently, Muslim 
general population viewed the Caliph who brought the entire God blessing wealth to his own 
community as the legitimate authority.
46
  Above all, Muslim chroniclers attributed the 
expansions of the Islamic empire to the creation, establishment, and spread of a new religion.
47
  
This is not to engage in the debate of whether (or not) Muslims converted the submitted states 
into Islam.  Better yet, this point indicates that the imperial conquests became a holy mission, 
and in return, the empire itself became a holy state.       
In outcome, the economic growth – viewed as superpower’s blessings – created a set of 
mutually agreed rules of combat among Muslims, because it reflected a sense of a common 
identity in the Islamic society, more precise, solidarity between the state administration and its 
subjects.  This sense combined the underlying secular and economic factors of the war with the 
inherent fulfillment of the religious obligations by which it turned the secular war into mass 
movements of holy and just war.  In return, it met the general population’s psychological need in 
the form of reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight.  Moreover, 
Muslim subjects viewed the empire’s authority in the form of the caliph and his administration 
that created the so-called godly blessing wealth as a legitimate authority.  The issue of righteous 
intentions, therefore, coated the act of war.  Hence, the relationship between the state and its 
citizens brought Jihad’s practices (the practical warfare) into action, because the empire 
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succeeded to provide the necessary means for the large-scale warfare.  Only under this term, the 
practical magnitude of Jihad turned into a totally mainstream activity, accepted and endorsed by 
an entire society.  Given the fact that Muslims considered the empire a holy and sovereign state, 
the practical warfare met the religious motivation.  
This is not to imply that Muslim participants dedicated themselves to Jihad for the reason 
that it brought them back the imperial wealth.  That is over-simplicity.  The point is that Muslims 
participants devoted themselves to Jihad with the thrust of their worldviews; and their Islamic 
identity bestowed the major force of their worldviews.  To appreciate the significance of this 
fact, over time the definition ‘Muslims’ relatively described the mighty dominating community 
of the holy Islamic empire.  Gradually, the golden age of the Islamic empire became the actual 
definition of the term ‘Muslims.’  Surely, Muslim chroniclers had no interest to define 
themselves with failures.  In addition, this definition glossed as the thin layer of gregarious self-
satisfaction, which combined both the religious and worldly powers together, namely the God-
given authority to dominate and civilize the world.  Therefore, Muslims viewed other nations’ 
submission to the Islamic empire as equal as submission to God himself.
48
   This is not to admit 
that Muslims followed a theory of ‘special election.’  Although it is hard to dispute this line of 
argument, it would be more reasonable to state that the ascending imperial triumph created an 
ongoing belief among Muslims in the God-given ‘right of domination.’                      
Nonetheless, from the stabilization of Muslim’s frontiers with the outside world and the 
cessation of Islamic conquests in the ninth century, Muslim’s major cities enjoyed a case of 
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mutual peace and tolerance with the world outside their borders.
49
  This step, however, ended the 
increase in landed wealth within the Islamic Empire.  For centuries, landed wealth represented 
the main wealth and revenue in the Islamic empire, and new wealth came majorly from wars and 
politics not from enterprise.  In the absence of economic innovations, the cessation of the 
conquests turned the Islamic empire into a standstill form of pax Islamica.  Deprived from 
gaining access to more natural resources, the growing population began to outstrip the available 
resources.
50
  In this process, the greatest military success, which locked economic growth to the 
Islamic state, destroyed the model military state.  The widespread use of servants in the military 
severely restricted the scope for free indigenous Muslims, blocked their fair-share in previous 
booty organization and denied their influence over foreign policy.
51
   
The shift among Muslims from reliance on Muslim subjects within to reliance on chattel 
servants from outside indicates that a wholly new social class of military elites emerged in the 
Islamic world.  The Atabegs class
52
 became a cultural and linguistic distinctive feature in the 
Islamic societies.  In a short period, the new military elites obtained political power over the 
state, which they used to acquire wealth rather than creating it.  In essence, Muslims’ foreign 
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wars and expansion gradually ceased to be the occupation of Muslim general population.
53
  This 
step, in retrospect, brought about the end to the positive relationship between the Islamic state 
and its subjects.  Notably, that change had no significant impact on the intellectual works for 
Muslim juries continued to provide logical theories of Jihad.  However, if what follows has a 
static appearance on the practical field, it is because the relationship between Muslim leaders and 
their subjects witnessed a sharp negative turn.   
For the leaders’ class, political distinctions concerning the legitimacy of the authority – 
together with the lack of right intent – influenced their practical response to the crusaders.  
Between 1092- 1094, the Islamic world suffered a clean sweep of all major political leaders from 
Egypt eastwards.  The murder of the greatest figure of the Seljuk Empire, the vizier Nizam al-
Mulk, and then the death of the Seljuk’s Sultan Malikshah, devastated the Seljuk’s Sultanate.  In 
Egypt, the death of the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir followed by the death of his vizier Badr al-
Jamali brought about the end to the Fatimid’s dynasty.  The same year, 1094, witnessed the death 
of the Abbasside Sunni caliph, al-Muqtadi.
54
  In the absence of rightful leadership, the military 
and bureaucratic elites shifted the role of the Islamic state into a state governed by status and 
civic ideologies.  This policy disintegrated the Islamic empire into principalities over which 
wealth motivated members of ruling families to fight each other.   
 Ibn al-Athir perceived the state of affairs of the Islamic world in the statement: 
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 When the Franks – may God frustrate them – extended their control over what 
they had conquered of the lands of Islam and it turned out well for them that the 
troops and the kings of Islam were preoccupied with fighting each other, at that 
time opinions were divided among the Muslims, desires differed and wealth was 
squandered.
55
  
Ibn al-Athir’s statement denoted the impact of the shocking defeat on a Muslim.  It seems that he 
attempted to absorb the humiliating defeat.  Hence, he claimed that Muslims no longer treated 
their land as a holy domain, but rather as merely wealth.  Although this point indicates the 
gradual shift in Muslims’ ideology of the role of the state, it illuminated Ibn al-Athir’s divided 
attitude between the glorious past and the shocking present.  For centuries, the House of Islam 
(the Islamic empire) meant something more to Muslims than a modern nation-state.  It did not 
mean merely land or wealth.  The Islamic state was a rational-driven holy and sovereign state.  It 
made law within and outside its borders; it made war or peace as it saw fit.
56
  The defeat, 
however, demythologized Muslims symbol divinely state.  In addition, he portrayed the image of 
the Islamic state to the elites’ class.  According to Ibn al-Athir, the Islamic state meant wealth to 
the Atabegs.  This ideology faded the existence of the righteous intentions away from wars led 
by the existed leadership.          
  The general thrust of a just war is that a nation waging war should be doing it for the 
cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest.  On that account, Muslim subjects may 
counter that national interest is paramount.  Therefore, the issue of intention raises the concern of 
practicalities for the reason that it induces wider number of citizens to support the war.  
Consequentially, a leader’s reaction to an expected aggression profoundly demonstrates the 
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possession of good intent.  To the Fatimid, the appearance of the First Crusade was not a 
surprise.  The Aleppan chronicler, al-Azimi, mentioned that the Byzantine Emperor had 
informed the Fatimid authorities early about the appearance of the Franks.  The Fatimid, 
however, determined to use crusaders’ army for their interest.  In reality, the Crusaders inflicted 
damage into the Seljuk Empire, the political and sectarian rivals of the Fatimid.  Therefore, it 
was not a coincidence that the Fatimid possessed Jerusalem, while the Seljuk’s army battled the 
First Crusade in Anatolia.
57
   
On the other hand, the cessation of the Abbasside conquests substituted the strong 
Caliphate by an idle state.  To the Sunni world, the first focus for any call to Jihad falls on the 
Abbasside Caliph in Baghdad.  In just war thinking, the criterion of the legitimate authority 
serves a formal purpose to think about the use of lethal force.  Thus, the Caliph – who was the 
supreme ruler and head over the entire Sunni-Muslim community – had the ultimate 
responsibility for military operations.  It was his duty to call for Jihad, weighing its costs and 
benefits for the Muslims in any given circumstances, issues the summons and the declaration, 
which signals the presence of war.
58
  In theory, the Abbasside Caliph al-Mustazhir had the 
legitimate authority to wage and promote such a holy war against the Franks.
59
   
Nonetheless, al-Mustazhir had lost much of his territories to the Turkic military elites.  
This process hindered the major source of income to the state.  In return, al-Mustazhir lost the 
economic stimulus to wage wars against the crusades.  Despite the envoys sent to Baghdad 
requesting the Caliph's support, the Caliph ignored all requests.  Ibn al-Jawazi recorded somberly 
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the story of al-Harawi, a judge from Damascus, requesting the Caliph to send his troops to aid 
the Syrians.  Nonetheless, it seems that al-Mustazhir disregarded the concern.
60
  Although there 
is no evidence, it is my impression that the Caliph promoted his personal gain, since the crusader 
army inflected damage to all the forces of his political rivalries including: the Turkic Atabegs, 
the Seljuk Empire, and the Fatimid Caliphate.  I repeat this is merely an impression until 
properly researched.  
To this concern, Hitti stated that, the crusaders were “a strange and unexpected enemy.”61  
Perhaps it is true to refer to the crusaders as a strange enemy, but definitely, they were an 
expected one.  News of the crusaders approaching the Islamic world had circulated among 
political leaders, who in return determined to use the forthcoming army for their personal 
interests.  Hence, Muslim leaders’ reaction to the expected crusader army eliminated the 
presence of the right intent in their wars.  Thus, after the Crusader States slotted into the political 
map of the Islamic world, the Turkic Atabegs, Fatimid, Seljuk, and perhaps even the Abbasids 
were willing to use them.
62
  For example, Ridawan, the governor of Aleppo maintained political 
alliance with Tancred of Antioch against the ruler of Mosul.
63
  Similar arrangements took place 
between the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Fatimid Caliphate through Shams al-
Khalifa, the governor of Ascalon who was mainly motivated by keeping the trade undisturbed.
64
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According to Ibn al-Adim, the political elites of Aleppo were in favor of the Franks’ existence 
because they helped perpetuate the independent status of their city.
65
  
The issue of right intent demonstrates the level of moral values that justifies the war.  In 
return, the presence of moral values provides the religious perspective to the act of violence.  
This is not to underestimate the matter of necessity.  That is to imply that in the presence of 
controversial intellectual works that justified the act of war, the concerns of necessity could 
possibly elevate any practical warfare to the level of Jihad.  Hence, it is surely hard to determine 
what Muslim actions may (or may not) be called a Jihad.  This step, however, depends on the 
extent of Muslims’ support to the movement because it points to the level of shared motivations 
in a common society.  By applying the former analysis on Zengi’s movement, though his 
movement presented a necessity due to the pressure of the crusaders, it lacked the public support.     
Sivan argued that the serious mobilization of Jihad as an instrument in the war against 
the crusaders began in the time of Zengi and reached its peak when Zengi sacked Edessa in 
1144.
66
  In practice, although Zengi’s response represented the first serious Islamic practical 
warfare against the crusaders, Zengi’s attack on Edessa offered another example of an 
opportunistic movement.  Definitely, Zengi’s attempts lacked the Syrian publics’ support, which 
was vital to the practical and moral magnitudes of his movement.  To appreciate the significance 
of this fact, the religious class offered no support to Zengi, which was important to color his 
activities with Islamic zeal.  Ibn al-Qalanisi stated on Zengi’s attempt to acquire Damascus, “The 
amir Imad al-Din Atabek had long been desirous of it, ambitious to possess himself of it, and on 
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the watch to seize any opportunity against it.”67  This statement, in keeping with Zengi’s record, 
indicates a man following personal ambitions.  Before taking Edessa, Zengi aimed at obtaining 
Damascus itself.  Although he gained control of Homs and Baalbek, he failed to take Damascus.  
Zengi stood as a grave threat in Syria to both Muslims and Crusaders, not only because of his 
military skills, but also and majorly because of his exceptional brutality and cruel behaviors.
68
  
Ibn al-Qalanisi, who was an inhabitant of Damascus, described Zengi’s failure at Damascus, 
“There was a wholesale slaughter.  Survivors were killed or imprisoned. Those who could, 
whether or not they were wounded, escaped the city. That day, but for God’s grace, the city 
would have fallen.”69 
Certainly, Zengi threatened the Damascenes more than the Franks.  Ibn al-Qalanisi's 
thankful feelings towards Zengi’s disappointment at the walls of Damascus explain a 
Damascene’s relieve.  This proves that the publics of Syria perceived Zengi’s movements as a 
man who aimed at conquering them.  In return, his wars lacked their support.  In addition, 
regarding Zengi’s threat to Damascus, the Damascenes signed a pact with the Franks to drive 
Zengi away.
70
  Apparently, the Damascenes chose the safer path – though not proper – to shake 
hands with the crusaders than giving up to Zengi.  There is no evidence that the Damascenes 
opposed their ruler when he decided to make an alliance with the Franks.  It seems that Muslim 
subjects had no enthusiasm toward Zengi’s movements.  Whether (or not) Zengi provided a 
leadership of Jihad, scholars are free to express their moral judgment.  It is important to stress, 
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however, that some Muslims viewed Zengi in this light; and it is surely plausible to argue that his 
victory at Edessa raised Muslim hopes in the struggle with the Franks.
71
  Nonetheless, Zengi’s 
ruthlessness disturbed his relationship with Muslim subjects.  In return, Zengi’s movements 
remained petite. 
Behind this opportunistic Islamic leadership, the major force of the Islamic world in the 
form of Muslim subjects maintained a low-voice of pan-Islamism.  There is no doubt that the 
loss of the Jerusalem provoked religious fervor among the general population.
72
  Although in 
reality, Muslim peasants might have viewed the idea of fighting for any of the warlords, who 
technically allied with the Franks against fellow Muslims, a deficient and an unjust war.  This is 
not to imply that Muslim leaders’ movements lacked the support of religious theories, eventually 
each warlord propagandized his personal campaigns against crusaders as a Jihad.
73
  However, 
there is no evidence that Muslim subjects become members of any major military campaigns 
against the crusaders except for the defense of their own cities.
74
  The dilemma occurs in 
peasants’ conceptualizations of the holy war.   
For centuries, Muslim called the Islamic empire, Umma.  This concept meant 
‘community’ and reflected the very identity of Muslims.  In return, Muslims became members of 
wars to defend (or to expand the dominating power of) their identity.  That is to consider all the 
moral and material rewards of these wars.  Therefore, Muslim mythologized the idea of the 
Islamic state.  In the end, Muslims fought for the Islamic state and not for a specific monarch.  
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Therefore, the Islamic state as a shared identity provided the moral justice for the Jihad.  After 
the impact of the First Crusade, the choice to fight meant fighting for a specific leader rather than 
for the state itself.  Therefore, the ideology of self-defense provided the moral justice in 
reference to the dogma of Jihad.  This new ideology replaced the principle of fighting for the 
Islamic state.  This is plausible in keeping with the social and economical transformation to the 
role of the Islamic state.   
Above all, the invasion of the First Crusade demythologized Muslims high expectations 
regarding the mighty Islamic state.  After centuries of literary works of mythologizing the 
invincible Islamic empire, the crushing defeat was a reality.  In the eyes of its inhabitants, not 
only Muslim soldiers, but also God himself defended the Islamic empire.  Not for nothing 
Muslims called their dominion, ‘House of Islam’ for within its territories exists the ‘true 
believers’75 of god and the innumerable holy buildings.  They ranged from Mecca to Jerusalem 
and from the ages of Moses and Jacob to Jesus, Mohamed, and the Great Caliphs.  Nonetheless, 
the devastating defeat was a reality.  In return, Muslims’ morals plummeted; and so too their 
enthusiasm to Jihad.  On the other hand, the crusaders have never been more than a dominant 
minority of distinctive cultures in the Islamic world like the atabegs.  These transformations 
deprived Muslim subjects of a way of serving the state.       
In a case of limited natural resources, the economical and political rise of the Turkic 
military class led to the political decline of the general population’s influence on the state.76  This 
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decline reduced the subjects’ survival needs down to only the need to live and to subsist.  Even 
in survival situations like the impact of the First Crusade, Muslim subjects needed to still care 
about few little things to keep their subsisting needs together with as much as possible of dignity.  
This psychological approach explains those who chose modus vivendi with the Crusaders.  Thus, 
to understand the impact the First Crusade on Muslim subjects and its consequences, the starting 
point must surely be three facts.  First, Muslim general population viewed the Islamic world as 
one world, even after the city-states’ political division.  In theory, the title city-state indicates the 
administrative definition of a territory, though the city-state in the Islamic empire was a province 
of the much larger Islamic state, whether the Abbasside or the Fatimid.  Any territorial state 
which has a number of conglomerations within its border must necessarily define and distinguish 
among those conglomerations for the purposes of security, taxation, and all the other demands 
and services that social life entails.     
Although after the fragmentation, the Islamic empire, which for centuries defined the 
term ‘Muslims,’ became just a theory: memory preservations of what once was a great empire, 
and in retrospect, memory preservation of what once characterized Muslims’ identity.  Ironically, 
all Muslim chroniclers of the crusades defined themselves and their communities as ‘Muslims’ 
regardless of their cultural diversities and political disintegrations.  This definition brought back 
the memories of centuries of a political unity by which the Islamic empire became an identity 
and its community defined itself with the term ‘Muslims.’  Nonetheless, chroniclers continued to 
use the same term to define themselves.  It seems plausible to state that Muslim chroniclers 
looked back to the glorious past of the Islamic empire to escape the straightjackets of present 
failures.  Therefore, Muslim chroniclers tended to view themselves as members of the great and 
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successful empire.
77
  Second, urbanization characterized the Islamic world more than any other 
society at this time.  Third, the foundation of each social class – which has attained a certain 
degree of development and has been brought about by the exchange of commodities – is the 
separation of town from country.  This is not an exhaustive list, but it will explain the reasons 
that deprived Muslim subjects away from wars and politics after the impact of the First Crusade. 
Although neither geographers nor historians nor sociologists agreed on a standard 
definition for the term ‘city,’ in socioeconomic terms, cities arose because of the incapacity of 
the two forms of human associations, the household and the larger kinship grouping, to satisfy all 
legitimate needs of their members.  Self-sufficiency was, therefore, the objective, and a properly 
structured city should be able to achieve that goal, save for the unavoidable lack of essential 
natural resources, for which foreign trade was admissible.  The Islamic cities mainly were 
trading centers, where luxurious goods of the Far East found their way to the West.  Before the 
foundation of the Crusader States, the rise of the Atabegs led to a spoils system.  This 
development adversely affected the activities of the merchants, who suffered from the demands 
of the ruler and his military followers.  In return, the increasing interest of the state changed the 
social status of Muslim subjects in the urban areas into servants to the Atabegs’ interest.78  In 
Muslims’ trading cycle, coastal towns represented the outlet to the Mediterranean.  For centuries, 
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the Islamic state provided high measures of protection and innovations that facilitated the trading 
cycles.  Once the coastal towns fell to the crusaders, it was necessary for Muslim traders to find a 
way to keep the sufficiency of their trading business without any support from the Islamic state.  
Consequently, Muslim traders and sea captains enjoyed a safe-conduct from a king of Jerusalem, 
and by the thirteenth-century, there was an important Syrian trading community in Tyre.
79
   
For security purposes of city autonomy, cities granted higher levels of safety to the 
inhabitants due to the adequate fortifications.  Thus, the majority of Muslim general population 
inhibited major cities like Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad.  For the Islamic major cities, the 
impact of the First Crusade did not exceed the limits of stories, which the survivors mentioned.  
Although Muslim subjects could have encountered delegations from Syria visiting Baghdad to 
request the Caliph’s military assistance, it seems that subjects in Muslim major cities adapted a 
form of politics isolationism.  The long-term isolation of Muslim general population from being 
involved in foreign affairs and wars dominated the momentum.  Hence, the general population 
viewed the problem of the crusader presence in Syria as a matter of high politics.  In return, 
Muslim subjects left the matter to Muslim politicians, leaders, and military.
80
  
For the rural areas, the Islamic state distributed portions of the conquered lands amongst 
Muslim subjects in the form of semi-ownership in return for a regular payment during the age of 
Islamic expansions.  Notably, Muslim citizens who took these lands were soldiers in the Islamic 
army, thus indigenous Christians or Jews remained working and living on the land in return for a 
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rental or payment to the landlords.  Therefore, the majority of inhabitants in the Islamic country 
continued to be indigenous Christians and Jews.  After the end of the expansion, the state failed 
to make payments to the new military class.  Consequently, the state granted military officers the 
fiscal rights to collect the land revenues for their salaries.  In practice, the grantee exercised 
economic and social de facto control.  This process contributed to the depopulation of the rural 
parts of the Islamic Empire.  Muslim subjects left the rural parts and resided in urban areas in 
search for other business.
81
  
Therefore, very few Arabs were productive settlers of the land after the foundation of the 
Crusader States, especially in Palestine and Syria.  A few were landlords who used native tenants 
to cultivate their estates.  Generally, they were nomadic tribesmen, soldiers, and officials, all of 
whom lived off the poll tax.
82
  Although as well as the vicissitude, crusaders onslaught followed 
by a wave of Muslim internal migration.  In 1100, Ibn Muyasser stated, “Many people from the 
Syrian territories came to Egypt fleeing from the Franks and famine.”83  There is also some 
evidence for refugee movements in Syria and Palestine.
84
  Nonetheless, almost all Muslim 
chroniclers who recorded the native displacement activities portrayed references neither to the 
status nor to the nature of the refugees.
85
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Although religion provides an important psychological force, especially in the case of 
Jerusalem, it was not the sole driving force for counter-crusading movements.  It seems that the 
gradual shift in the role of the Islamic state influenced Muslim subjects’ understanding of 
politics.  A political virtue gives men a sense of justice, and sufficient consideration for rights of 
the self and the others to make the civilized community.
86
  This virtue makes civil peace possible 
because peasants would at least be able to insure their survival and subsistence needs.  In return, 
this persuaded Muslim subjects to set a comparison between the truthful and the false man.  For 
Muslim subjects, the idea of Jihad mirrored their perception to justice.  This quest rejoins the 
interpretation that this step reflects peasants’ attempt of modus vivendi with Crusaders.  E. P. 
Thompson linked the notion of a new capitalist cultural mentality, which uses the economical 
resources for its own ends against peasants and their need for subsistence insurance from the 
mysterious future, especially in hard times; a concept which Thompson called ‘moral 
economy’.87   
Thompson’s argument revealed a social psychological approach to a ruling class that 
practices submissive policy against their subjects.  This facet revealed a suppressed general 
population who lived in a society that does not suit their purposes.  The issue implicit in the 
notion of how far the economy and power relations within a society influence the diverse moral 
understandings of justice, without which a society suffers the loss of the shared identity.  The 
sense of shared identity, in retrospect, produces a strong and sufficient community against 
foreign threats because it reveals similar understandings of justice.  By comparison, the growing 
sense of injustice between the authorities of the Islamic state and their subjects created an 
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underlying social crisis.  This negative assessment altered the subjects’ conceptualization of 
Jihad in response to foreign threats from as high as pan-Islamism down to the self and family 
members. 
The religious class, however, promoted legal Jihad’s theories against the Franks.  Few 
isolated voices spoke out in concentration at the loss of Jerusalem.  The legal judge 'qadi' Abu al-
Fadl al-Kashshab of Aleppo represented an early model for the active participation of the 
religious class in the Jihad against the Franks.  Abu al-Fadl preached the teaching of Jihad 
among the publics of Aleppo in an attempt to infuse Islamic fervor into the general population.  
His preaching said Ibn al-Adim on what he heard from one of the soldiers who were listening to 
the preaching of Abu al-Fadl, “we have come from our lands to follow a man in a turban.” 88  
This statement presented the image of a man of religion, identified by his turban, and preaching 
Jihad to the public.  Although these sorts of attempts came to be very limited, only the religious 
class had the ability to deal with Muslim’s social disorientation.  The religious class represented 
the key-link to unite the efforts of the general population together with the authorities into a 
wide-scale Jihad against the Franks because they provide the religious coating on the act of 
fighting.
89
 
A similar turbulence took place in the Caliph’s mosque of Baghdad.  There, the religious 
class laid shame on their leadership by pressing the public against them.  It seems that this 
movement did not amuse the de facto ruler of the Sunni Caliph, al-Mustazhir, as it challenged his 
legal authority.
90
  Another outstanding exception to the activities of the religious class was the 
Syrian legist Ali Ibn Tahir al-Sulami.  Al-Sulami preached publicly to the general population in 
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the Omayyad mosque of Damascus in the early years after the fall of Jerusalem.  Al-Sulami 
urged his listeners – while preaching his Kitab al-Jihad – to take up arms against the Crusaders.  
He exerted all Muslim peasants in the region to unite in opposition to the Latin Christian 
invaders.  In his preaching, he demonstrated the examples of the early Caliphs and their 
prosecution of Jihad.  Thus, he proposed that the weakness and negligence of later caliphs led to 
the humiliating defeat of Muslims.
91
    
  To this concern, al-Sulami attempted to introduce Islamic fervor to the unconcerned 
Caliph.  He aspired to use public opinion to urge the Caliph to practice Jihad.  al-Sulami aimed 
his message, as well, at the Atabeg.  He portrayed them as appointees from God to watch over 
and defend the land of Islam, rather than appointees from the Caliph.
92
  Most significant 
regarding al-Sulami’s call for Jihad, he stated that the provincial rulers did not require the 
Caliph’s authorization to wage defensive holy war (Jihad) against enemies.93  The importance of 
this step reflects that the issue of necessity concerned al-Sulami’s approach more than the issue 
of legitimacy.  Although al-Sulami’s call proved that he realized that his sense of self was now 
under assault from the crusaders,
94
 it showed the tendency to minimize the distance between the 
glorious past and the current state of the Islamic world.
95
   
Al-Sulami’s identification with the historical discipline of the Islamic Rightly Guided 
Caliphs that defined his texts discussed his relationship to the idea of pan-Islamism.
96
  In 
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addition, it demonstrated his connection to the history of the Islamic empire.  All make clear that 
the process of self-identification with the past of the Islamic empire was a continuing one, not 
something fixed once and for all by the events.  These memories constituted (if not a conscious 
critique of the Islamic history) at least an implicit questioning of its limits, more precisely, the 
limits of time and space.  Al-Sulami placed the historical context of the Islamic empire into an 
unfit situation.  The Abbasside Caliph, who stood as the legitimate leader of the Sunni Muslims, 
suffered a major weakness and the Turkic Atabegs promoted their personal interest.  Muslim 
subjects, on the other hand, had no way to practice Jihad and serve the state.  Consequently, all 
practical attempts of Jihad against the crusaders were ill affirmed, ill supported, and of no 
significance. 
Indeed, in the latter half of the tenth century, Ibn Hawaqal condemned the absence of the 
Jihad.
97
  The Arab geographer Al-Muqaddasi supported this criticism.  Speaking about the 
province of Syria, al-Muqaddasi complained that, “the inhabitants have no enthusiasm for Jihad 
and no energy in the struggle against the enemy.”98  Though the concept of Jihad was, is, and 
will always be an embedded pillar in the Islamic belief, this elastic concept carried different 
percepts to each individual.  Nonetheless, Ibn Hawqal and al-Muqaddasi’s references to Jihad 
aimed at the practical warfare against the crusaders.  Responsibilities for the practical 
performance of Jihad fell on the leaders and the subjects.  Nonetheless, the socioeconomic and 
sociopolitical crisis pre-existed in the Islamic world had devastated the Islamic state.  Although 
the idea of ‘mighty Islamic empire’ survived in the memories of Muslim citizens, Muslims 
attempted to absorb the new reality of the shocking defeat.  It was during this period that 
Muslims chose different forms of ‘live and let live’ with the newcomers.   
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 Crusaders’ invasion of the Islamic land was in a high sense among Muslims a religious 
war.
99
  Such a concept should have provoked Muslims – who saw their lands as holy chosen 
domains – to wage a holy war against the invaders.  Muslims, however, resented their variance 
with one another.  Though the First Crusade was not a surprise, its success shocked Muslims 
who had the confidence that outbreaks of enemies of Islam would be at most temporary setbacks 
in a longer story of Islamic victories.  When the humiliating defeat occurred, Muslims searched 
the depth of their memories to discover some vestige of the past, not the past of individual, 
faltering and ephemeral, but rather that of the community, which, though defeated, nonetheless 
represented that the defeat was a permanent instance in the lasting victories.  This indicates that 
Muslims underestimated the strength of the First Crusade.  Even after the defeat, Muslims failed 
to bridge the gap between the past and the present; and when they realized that the defeat was an 
avoidable fact, each division followed a procedure to insure a simple survival instinct.     
In addition to Muslims’ divided attitude between the past and the present, the invasion 
revealed that the Muslims’ political disorientation brought about a socioeconomic crisis.  It 
seems plausible to state that Muslims’ deep confidence in the holy power of the Islamic state 
convinced them that even at the time of bewilderment, god protected the Islamic land.  
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that not long before the First Crusade, this social crisis 
prompted the Islamic legist, al-Ghazali, to develop a social economic hypothesis by which he 
urged the state’s authorities to regulate the economic activities of individuals.  Al-Ghazali 
recognized the fact that, although salvation bestowed the ultimate goal of human actions, the 
pursuit of a social welfare is a necessary part for achieving that goal because without it, the 
social unrest would devastate individuals’ moralities.  In return, it would devastate the example 
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‘divinely state.’  Accordingly, he urged the state to ensure the proper functioning of the economy 
and the fulfillment of what he called the divinely ordained social obligations.
100
   
Al-Ghazali’s approach brought about an analogous premise to the Weberian philosophy 
that members of different social classes adopt different belief systems to express their social 
situation.
101
  This meant that the major body of Muslim general population shared different 
religious beliefs than those of the political authorities.  In return, this step indicates that 
understandings of Jihad differed among Muslims.  It is possible to characterize the developments 
in the Islamic world as a privatization of power where individual Atabegs successfully defied the 
residual power of the state.  This implies that the Atabegs privatized the ideology of Jihad after 
the privatization of the Islamic state, regardless of the issues of legitimacy, causation, intention, 
and above all, the concerns of their subjects.  As Henri Frankfort phrased it, “without oriental 
precedent in one respect: the gods and the universe were described by him as a matter of private 
interest.”102  
It is worth stressing at the point that there is no Marxism there, no theory, merely the 
direct result to the gradual cession of the power and domination of what once was a large human 
institution, namely the great Islamic empire.  This step coupled with a conflicted attitude about 
Muslims self-identity.  After the defeat, Muslims found themselves torn between the high 
expectations of the past and the present crisis.  Unable to affirm any of them, Muslims absorbed 
the defeat as a fact and chose to live with the crusaders.  It would be naive, however, to state that 
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without the arrival to more settled social relations and the revival of economics, Muslims failed 
to embrace Jihad.  This rather implies that Muslim participants committed themselves to Jihad 
with the impetus of a worldview, above all the practical role of the human institution responsible 
for organizing Muslim efforts, the state.   
In any case, it does not alter the important fact that the Islamic empire – which previously 
dominated the Near East – existed.  Surely, all chroniclers referred to themselves as Muslims, 
regardless of their coherent diversity.  Baghdad, though decayed, remained the center of politics, 
diplomacy, administration, and the source of the identity of the Islamic empire.  It is worth 
stressing again that the Islamic empire in the seventh century, let alone the empire of the eighth 
century, was by the standards of the pre-industrial world, a powerful, well-organized, and 
wealthy state.  Curiously enough, the Islamic empire – which played a large part in all Jihad 
campaigns before the presence of the Crusades – was the only one where men had evolved a 
constitution in which the individual was trained and disciplined to be subordinate.  Driven out of 
Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, the empire could no longer be a great power.  It was now battling for 
its very survival, and to do so it would have to adapt.      
  The impact of the First Crusade, however, revealed these realities.  It revealed that the 
Islamic empire existed, but it was not the same empire of the seventh century.  Though it 
survived two centuries of crisis, it was no longer the superpower of the Near East.  The imperial 
domination was now a myth.  Notably, Muslims preserved this fable in their memories.  It 
revealed also that Muslims were indeed subjects, although not to a ‘Great Monarch’, but to the 
State itself, which for centuries fulfilled their moral and material needs.  In reality, the Islamic 
empire was a completely different state when the First Crusade struck the Islamic world.  The 
presence of the Islamic empire preserved a number of fundamental institutions including the 
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Caliph Court and Sunni orthodoxy.  Nonetheless, the Atabegs privatized other important 
institutions like the army and taxation.  Both institutions were important key-factors to the 
successful warfare of all historical Islamic victories.  Therefore, Muslims lived in a community 
established in the seventh-century that did not match the state of reality in the ninth-century.  
This point stands to prove the lack of adaptability.  It seems plausible to state that for the great 
Islamic empire existed only in theory, the concept ‘Muslims’, which for century defined the 
common identity of a whole community, was a theory as well.  Unlike the age of expansion, the 
definition ‘Muslims’ described a religious, politic, and economic unite.  Now, the definition 
‘Muslims’ became a vague concept that described the broad-spectrum religious identity of 
distinctive communities.               
 The ideology of the holy war, though highly moral, it relies heavily on general 
population’s awareness that they share something in common: a belief in a paramount national 
cause to acknowledge loyalty to the state itself.  This form of loyalty creates a sense of shared 
identity that offers the turbulent peasants with legitimate causations to fight.  In the practical 
absence of the Islamic empire, Muslims lost the shared identity and the human institution that 
manage their Jihad’s efforts.  Therefore, the shocking defeat convinced Muslims that their 
Jihad’s practices brought them back neither a better life nor the hopes of a better life nor the 
aspiration of salvation.  In return, the extent of Muslim citizens’ involvement in war against the 
First Crusade was extremely short.  Consequently, it is true to claim that although the sense of 
Jihad existed in theories,
103
 the practical absence of the Islamic state influenced the lack of the 
practical Jihad.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TURNING POINT 
The whole of the Near East was on the move.  So indeed must have seemed to some 
Muslim peasants, looking up bewildered from their patch of land, as a massive army surged past 
like a river in spate.  Fifty years after the First Crusade, Latin’s ambition and confidence in 
God’s divine power influenced the call for the Second Crusade.  The capture of Edessa in 1144 
by Zengi of Mosul provoked the papacy to issue the charter of the Second Crusade.  In 1145, 
Pope Eugenius III addressed Quantum praedecessores to King Louis VII and the French 
nobility.  The Levant’s leg of the campaign aimed at recapturing the city of Edessa from 
Zengi.
104
  Despite the campaign’s vast magnitude, the Second Crusade proved to be a disaster to 
Europeans.  Rather than recapturing Edessa or taking Aleppo, the campaign broke at the gates of 
Damascus. 
The invasion of Damascus, which was about to take place, marked a new phase toward 
the absence of Jihad in the Islamic world.  Due to the Frankish siege of Damascus, Muslim’s 
mood within Damascus and thereafter elsewhere in Syria seemed to have changed.  Though 
almost every small area and city-state was at variance with the other, what Muslims resented 
after the Second Crusade was the desperate need for a strong leader to call himself the God-
appointed ruler of all other men.  Therefore, the impact of the Second Crusade united nearly all 
Muslims in the struggle.  The invasion forced all Muslims to follow a simple survival instinct.  
Indeed, not since Muslim’s humiliating experience of the First Crusade and the loss of 
Jerusalem, had the inhabitants of a major Muslim city felt the presence of the Franks within their 
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walls.  Therefore, this chapter will focus on the impact of the Second Crusade on Muslims’ 
social and moral disciplines, which led Muslims to embrace the practical Jihad.    
Apart from detailing the campaign, the impact of the Second Crusade brought about the 
political unity to the Islamic Empire.  A notable example of the formalistic approach is the point 
at which a voluntary association of independent Islamic states was converted into an Islamic 
Empire.  The impact of the Second Crusade triggered an alliance among the governors of 
northern Syria: Saif-ad-Din, Nur-ad-Din, and Unur of Damascus.  Ibn al-Athir, who wrote in 
northern Syria in the early thirteenth-century, indicated that Unur – the Atabeg of Damascus – 
appealed to Saif-ad-Din of Mosul, who joined Nur-ad-Din at Homs and was poised to march 
south to help lift the siege off Damascus.
105
  The sense of Ibn al-Athir’s writing is that Unur had 
appealed well before the siege began.  At most, such an action was a symbol, a brutal statement 
of the reality, but not the reality itself.  The word ‘voluntary’ is not even a good symbol, leading 
into remarkable verbal contortions.  Before appealing to the Zengids,
106
 Unur threatened the 
crusaders to hand over Damascus to the Zengids if the crusaders did not retreat.
107
  This step 
indicates that a survival instinct guided Unur’s decision.  Meanwhile he attempted to maintain 
the independent status of Damascus through negotiation with the crusaders, he prepared a 
secondary plan of voluntary league with the Atabegs of Mosul and Homs. 
In addition, the aftermath of the Second Crusade created the conditions for Nur-ad-Din to 
take control of Damascus and the whole of northern Syria in the name of uniting Muslim’s 
powers.
108
  The humiliating retreat of the campaign had evidently dealt an enormous blow to the 
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cause of crusading in the West.  Probably, the cumulative effect of fifty years of literary and 
architectural recordings of the First Crusade had contributed to a widespread European belief 
that God approved a new crusade and that it would be victorious.  Hence, when the campaign 
collapsed so dismally, European morals plummeted too.  As Europeans absorbed the outcome of 
the campaign, the papacy felt the consequences as well.  Such feeling may have influenced the 
pope’s caution over a new expedition.  It seems certain that the failure of the Second Crusade 
had an impact upon Europeans’ interest for crusading, notwithstanding repeated vocation support 
for the Holy Land.  While European settlers of the Levant made numerous appeals for help in the 
decades after the Second Crusade and the Papacy issued bulls that called for new campaigns in 
1157, 1165, 1166, 1169, 1173, 1181, 1184, and 1187, there was never enough political will to 
bring such bulls to life. The Second Crusade’s failure led to a period in which for nearly forty 
years European Christian demoralization was reflected in a low level.
109
 
It was during this period that Nur-ad-Din consolidated his powers on wide partitions of 
the Islamic world with the assistance of the religious classes.  Obviously, the absence of a strong 
Frankish threat, in the form of a new massive campaign, provided Nur-ad-Din with a valuable 
time toward the preparations of Jihad against the Crusaders, during which period, Nur-ad-Din 
focused on uniting Muslim’s lands.110   As Kohler argued that after taking Damascus, Nur-ad-
Din preferred to consolidate his powers in Syria rather than embarking Jihad against the 
Franks.
111
  It seems possible to state that Kohler centered the phenomenon of Jihad on returning 
Jerusalem.  Therefore, his analysis portrayed negative assessments on the fact that Nur-ad-Din 
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concentrated his campaigns on conquering other Muslim territories rather than fighting the 
Crusaders over Jerusalem. 
Certainly, neither Nur-ad-Din nor his allies anticipated all the consequences of the first 
step of association, in particular what would happen if a member-principality chose to secede.  
This league, however, was the first among Muslim leaders since the First Crusade to justify the 
hegemony and mastery of Nur-ad-Din over other Islamic principalities by proposing a common 
just cause, war against the Crusaders.  Hope and aspiration do not imply a defined program, but 
their presence in the Islamic world is demonstrated by the rapid Islamic coating that enabled 
Nur-ad-Din to acquire the decision-making power on the league.  In addition, it provided Nur-ad-
Din with manpower and psychology to exert force in the strictest sense, to impose his decisions 
and to punish the recalcitrant principalities.   
It seems possible to go farther and to state that though coercion of members of ruling 
families apparently was regarded as legitimate – and probably even compulsions against city-
states and principalities that did not wish to join the league – the need to clear the Islamic lands, 
more precisely, Damascus, from the crusader forces influenced the popularity of the vengeance 
appeal.  This public feeling made it impossible for Muslim leaders to collaborate with the 
Franks.  By comparison, in the early decades of the twelfth-century, Muslim leaders persuaded a 
policy of collaboration with the Franks.
112
  For example, at the peak of the First Crusade’s battles 
against the Seljuk, the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt collaborated with the Franks against the Seljuk in 
order to break the Seljuk’s power.113  For a short time in the history of mankind, it had been 
                                                        
 
112
 The Damascenes’ cooperated with the Franks to drive Zengi away from Damascus; 
Ibn Al-Qalanisi, The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades, 260.  
 
113
 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil Fi'l-tarikh, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Vol. X, 186; see also Michael 
Kohler, Allianzen und Vertage. 
  59 
proclaimed (even if not believed) that ‘might is not right.’  From this point on, the pattern of 
politics in the Islamic world was to alter, “all changed, changed utterly: a terrible beauty is 
born.”114  Common sense is right in that instance.  The shock and horror of the vast campaign 
upon Damascus ended the Damascenes’ – and later on most Muslims – mutual peace with the 
outside world and harnessed a new appeal to unite Muslim’s powers in Jihad against the 
Franks.
115
   
This is not to underestimate the league’s appeal, any more than the real fear of further 
Crusaders’ invasion.  The pull of ideology is never to be underestimated, nor is it easy to 
untangle ideology and reality.  In a conflict, there is no way to measure the exact respective 
balance of the two elements in determining the decision of an endangered nation.  Muslim’s 
sources, for example, mentioned the painful experience of the Damascenes during the siege of 
Damascus.  The sources seemed to have shed the light on the death of two members of 
Damascus’ religious class, the Malikite imam Yusuf al-Fandalawi and Abd al-Rahman al-
Halhuli, who died as martyrs in defense of the city.
116
   There is no doubt that the religious class 
of Damascus offered an emotional impact on repulsing the Second Crusade.  They exploited a 
real sense of Muslim’s need to embark Jihad against the Franks.  No wonder, it was during the 
Second Crusade, Ibn Asakir gave public readings of Abd Allah al-Mubark’s Kitab al-Jihad (the 
book of the Holy War) in Damascus, which inspired Abu al-Hassan Ibn Munqidah, brother of the 
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famous Usama, to volunteer to help raise the siege of Ascalon.
117
  Those revised theories of 
Jihad, in fact, offered nothing new to the previous ones.  Yet that step at this momentum 
indicates that reality in the form of the Crusaders’ threat to Damascus met the ideology of Jihad.  
The same principle applies on the Baghdadis.  Because Baghdad survived, the Islamic 
empire survived, at least in theory.  However decayed the city became, however much of the 
population may have dwindled, it remained the center of politics, diplomacy, administration, and 
above all, the source of the Muslims’ identity.  If the Crusaders managed to take Damascus, 
Baghdad or Cairo would have been the next target.  Certainly, that was an assumption, but it is 
an obvious one.  The Second Crusade’s hegemony on Damascus convinced Muslims that neither 
Jerusalem nor the Holy Land was the epitome of their conflict with the Crusaders.  Part of the 
explanation contributed to the mystery of the Second Crusade’s changing targets from Edessa to 
Damascus.  In between the original call for the campaign and the expedition’s arrival in the Latin 
East, the local population of Edessa attempted a revolt to recapture the city.  This, however, 
turned out to be a disaster.  The rebellion was crushed and the city was deserted.
118
  J. Phillips 
proposed that with Edessa in ruins, the crusaders had three options: to open a campaign on 
Aleppo, to move south and invest the Fatimid-held port of Ascalon, or to attack the city of 
Damascus.
119
  Out of three options, the Crusaders chose to aim their hegemony on Damascus.  
Although Damascus was the largest and most important city in Syria, that was the least 
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reasonable choice.  Looking back, the Damascenes collaborated with the Franks to drive Zengi’s 
forces.
120
  Therefore, both the Damascenes and the crusaders shared the same enemy.   
In any common sense, opening a campaign on the growing in power Nur-ad-Din of 
Aleppo or taking over the rich port of Ascalon would have made much more sense to the 
Muslims.  The Crusaders’ hegemony on Damascus, however, left the Muslims with one certain 
truth that collaborating with the Franks may save them from a certain particular battle, but it 
would not save them from the miseries of the war.  In addition, Damascus and Baghdad meant 
much more than a survival situation to Muslims.  Both cities were the core of Muslims’ identity: 
an inheritance from the Islamic golden age.  Therefore, the campaign on Damascus altered 
Muslims’ struggle against the crusaders from battling for the Holy Land to battling for their very 
survival and identity.  The growing sense of fear and intimidation in Damascus and thereafter in 
Baghdad influenced the rising call for Jihad.  This step came in the form of the Abbasside 
Caliph’s Jihad authorization to all the governors and fiefs of northern Syria.  Ibn al-Qalanisi 
stated:  
In the meantime there had arrived at Damascus the Sharif and amir Shams al-Din 
al-Husaini, the Naqib.  He had come on from Saif al-Din Ghazi, son of the 
Atabek, having been debuted as an envoy from the Caliphate to all the governors 
and to the tribes of the Turkmens, to urge them to assist the Muslims and engage 
in a Holy War [Jihad] against polytheists [Crusaders].
121
    
 
Regarding the Caliphal Jihad’s authorization, Köhler proposed that Nur-ad-Din and his 
league aimed their propaganda at acquiring the Caliphal legitimacy.
122
  Although it is hard to 
determine the exact balance of motives, which boosted the Abbasid Sunni Caliph at different 
stages, in reality, the Second Crusade’s attack on a major Muslim city like Damascus was an 
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extensive shift to counter-crusading movements.  In hard times, certainly, fear impairs decision-
making.
123
  During which time the magnitude of the threat together with the public reaction 
impose interests on the ruler.  In that situation, Nur-ad-Din and his league presented the last 
defensive mechanism to Baghdad, Baghdadis, and the Caliph.  In addition, Nur-ad-Din’s power 
emerged after the impact of the Second Crusade.  Muslim sources, apparently, agreed on the fact 
that the Franks withdrew from the gates of Damascus once they realized that Nur-ad-Din 
mobilized his army and headed their way.
124
  Hence, Nur-ad-Din gained no noteworthy activities 
in repulsing the Second Crusade.  Accordingly, the Caliph’s call came before the emerging 
power of Nur-ad-Din.  As the Baghdadis absorbed the danger of the campaign, the Caliph felt the 
consequences as well.  Such feeling may have influenced the Caliph’s authorization.  Hence, the 
authorization was, therefore, an inevitable matter on the Caliph who was under the pressure of 
his subjects.              
Sprinkling Schuller’s terminology of the Athenian empire may help to comprehend the 
last point.  Indirect domination consists in the fact that it builds on, or attempts to evoke, an 
interest of the ruled in the process of being ruled.
125
  The Second Crusade created a sense of 
reality among the Damascenes, the Muslims of northern Syria and Baghdad that the Crusaders 
did not aim their campaigns only at the liberation of Christian Holy Land, but rather at the 
invasion of the whole Islamic world.  Therefore, the new league became an inevitable matter to 
Muslims.  This analysis do not dispute that Muslim leaders welcomed the league when it was 
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created.
126
  However, self-defense of the Islamic states was the most obvious protective measure.  
The Crusaders twice invaded the Islamic lands, and Muslims had the strong confidence that they 
would try again.  Therefore, the league remained in existence without a moment’s faltering and 
its membership grew, willingly like the case with Damascus
127
 or by compulsion like the case 
with Egypt.
128
  
In a conflict, a prudent state may ‘voluntarily’, out of a general and wide spread support 
of the cause, save itself from the frightful consequences of resistance and ‘involuntary’ 
subjection, but some states do not.  This step depends heavily on the public support of the moral 
leadership, whether voluntary or involuntary.  If the general public supports the moral authority 
of leadership, then they will be more likely to give support both voluntarily and with stronger 
commitment to the cause.  In this case, lacking the data from the Islamic world with which to 
attempt a discussion of such moral sophistications, this next typology will focus on the outcome 
of Nur-ad-Din’s expansions on the growing imperial powers of the Islamic state.  This study 
does not imply by that concentration on economics that Muslims’ religious ideologies do not 
merit analysis or that social economics as a worldview and religious theories were separable, 
autonomous aspects of the story.  This rather meant that most Muslim participants committed 
themselves to Jihad with the incentive of worldviews that set a premium on their spiritual health.  
Difficult as it is in this case to reveal or even make a moral judgment on the complex motivations 
of the Muslims it is worth stressing in order to expose the worldviews that led to the revival of 
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Jihad’s practices.  The primary discussion here is how and why converting other Islamic 
principalities and city-states into Nur-ad-Din’s league concerned the Muslim general population.  
In particular, what material benefits did the general population obtain from this endeavor?  Did 
the imperial economy bring back the social justice to the Islamic world?  Finally, did the power 
of an empire influence the practical magnitude of Jihad?  Unfortunately, interference in internal 
affairs is less well understood, largely because of the inadequacy of the evidence and sources.  
Therefore, the emphasis on a system of social analysis might bridge the gap between Muslims’ 
myth of the early Islamic empire and their enthusiasm toward Jihad. 
In any study of the Islamic state, military service and tributes must be considered 
together, because the Islamic state, for the most, manipulated both.
129
  The difference before the 
Second Crusade that the Atabegs privatized both objects for personal purposes.
130
  Once Nur-ad-
Din claimed leadership on the league, each principality or city-state that joined the league 
contributed either cash or soldiers.  Ibn al-Qalanisi attributed on Nur-ad-Din’s request from the 
Damascenes, “you support me with the Askar [army or soldiers] of Damascus, and we aid one 
another in waging the Holy War [Jihad].”131  As time went on, Nur-ad-Din whittled down 
members of the league until, his name became the sole political leader over roughly all Syrian 
and Egyptian provinces.  In common sense, Nur-ad-Din’s growing authority restricted the 
dominance of other Muslim ruling families.  This step indicates that Nur-ad-Din’s power came at 
the cost of other members of ruling families rather than at the expense of the subjects.  In 
essence, Nur-ad-Din concentrated his wars and expansions, gradually, to reoccupy the Islamic 
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lands.  If what follows, therefore, has a static appearance, that is because Muslims affiliated the 
accomplishments of the Islamic state under the leadership of Nur-ad-Din with that of the early 
Islamic empire.  That is to consider moral and material endeavors.    
Nonetheless, the oral tradition of events in the Islamic world focused heavily on the 
religious dimension of the movements, which Nur-ad-Din employed for his expansions.  This is 
to imply that references to Nur-ad-Din in the Islamic sources are too skimpy, too unreliable, 
often regarded the Islamic zeal of Nur-ad-Din’s activities only, and without underpins to the 
financial implications.  One of the commonplaces of Islamic political rhetoric was that 
chroniclers often tended not to change the glorious past of the Islamic empire.  Not only 
prudence, but also fairness, justice, glory, and, above all, self-affiliation with the community that 
once dominated the Near East defended this principle.  For example, Ibn al-Athir stated on Nur-
ad-Din, “I have read the histories of early kings before Islam, and in Islam until these time of 
ours, and I have not seen after the Rightly Guided Caliphs and Umar Ibn Abd al-Aziz, a king of 
better conduct than the just king Nur-ad-Din.”132  The consideration of justice, glory, and 
historical victories surely explains why Ibn al-Athir liked to suppose the comparative between 
Nur-ad-Din and the early Islamic Caliphs. 
In fact, the religious class depicted the patronage image, which Nur-ad-Din gained 
throughout his career.  According to Elisseeff, after the capture of Damascus, Nur-ad-Din took 
each step in the name of Jihad against the Crusaders.
133
  Elisseeff took this reverential tone 
directly from the chroniclers themselves.  Ibn al-Adim stated, – probably more out of piety than 
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convections – “ from this point Nur-ad-Din dedicated himself to Jihad.”134  Ibn al-Qalanisi 
attributed on the religious career of Nur-ad-Din, “I seek nothing but the good of the Muslims and 
to make war against the Franks.”135  Al-Asfhani, the future advisor of Saladin as well, described 
Nur-ad-Din as ‘the most chaste, pious, sagacious, pure and virtuous of Kings.’  Al-Asfhani 
praised Nur-ad-Din for restoring ‘the splendor of Islam to the land of Syria.’136  Furthermore, the 
later chronicler Abu Shama described Nur-ad-Din as the most zealous in raiding the Franks.
137
  It 
is certainly possible to demythologize this picture of Nur-ad-Din.  The German scholar Köhler 
argued that Nur-ad-Din’s efforts in the service of Jihad in the first half of his career was not 
impressive, and his usage of Jihad’s propaganda as an instrument was only for political 
purposes.
138
                    
Meanwhile, this massive religious coating indicates to the growing aspirations and hopes 
of Muslims’ counter-crusading at the time of Nur-ad-Din, it demonstrates the social ethos, 
splendor, and justice.  Though vital to the religious dimension of Nur-ad-Din’s military 
operations, examining the economic implications will indicate the limit of available stimulus for 
large-scale warfare.  Economics were to the Muslims (and generally in the medieval world) an 
integral part of successful warfare and of the expansion of powers of a state or in this case, of 
merging a number of states into an empire.
139
  Nur-ad-Din’s expansions, therefore, brought back 
into the Islamic world, the large-scale human institution, namely ‘the Empire.’  The argument is 
                                                        
134
 Ibn al-Adim, Zubdat al-Halab min tarikh Halab, vol. II, 291. 
 
135
 Ibn Al-Qalanisi, The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades, 303. 
136
 Imad al-Din al-Isfhani, Sana al-Barq al-Shami, ed. F. al-Nabarawi (Cairo: Maktabat 
al-Khanji, 1979), 16. 
137
 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Rawdatayn, ed. H. Ahmad, Vol. I, II vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Kotob, 
1954), 175.  
 
138
 Michael Köhler, Allianzen und Vertage, 277. 
139
 On plundering in ancient societies, see H. Turney-High, Primitive War (Columbia , S. 
C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1949), 175-177.  
  67 
intense, and suffers the lack of statistics from the Islamic sources, but comparisons and contrasts 
between Nur-ad-Dins expansions and the previous Omayyad expansions, will be illuminating.  
That is to mean that all broad classificatory terms ‘Empire’ embrace a wide spectrum of 
individual instance, which is the obvious analogy.   
Consequently, it is important to consider the two offsetting of tributes and military 
services after the foundation of Nur-ad-Din’s State.  A tribute, in its narrow sense, is of course 
only one way that an imperial state drains funds from subject-states for its treasury.  The shift 
among Muslims there that Nur-ad-Din’s authority replaced that of the previous rulers of 
subjected principalities.  Hence, Nur-ad-Din patronage ended the fiscal rights, which previously 
the Islamic state gave to members of ruling families over Muslim lands and businesses.
140
  This 
is not to propose that Nur-ad-Din exempted subject-states from paying tributes.  Instead, his 
administration took the tributes directly for the state institution as a replacement for wasting 
much of it on the middle-beneficiaries.  In essence, this step boosted the levy of Nur-ad-Din’s 
state at the expense of Muslim ruling families and reduced the financial burden on the peasants’ 
class.  The case of Nur-ad-Din’s gradual occupation of Egypt is a decisive example.  It started 
out when Nur-ad-Din made an agreement with the Fatimid to help protecting Egypt from the 
Frankish siege in return for a Fatimid payment of one million dinars.  When the Franks 
intensified their pressure on the Fatimid government, Nur-ad-Din requested one-third of the 
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revenues of Egypt.
141
  Shortly after, Nur-ad-Din outset the Fatimid government and claimed the 
whole revenues for his state.
142
           
 As for the large-scale military campaigns, engagements were both expensive and 
unpredictable, to the participants if not to later historians, even those with heavy advantages on 
one side.  It required time and funds for Nur-ad-Din to subdue Egypt.  Gradually, Egypt 
appeared to be a great tribute-paying possession.  The Fatimid Empire, in general, had a 
reputation for being rich, which the massive constructions in Cairo confirmed it.
143
  Egypt then 
became a major contributor to Nur-ad-Din’s campaigns.  Unfortunately, no budget for Nur-ad-
Din’s state has survived, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries, Egyptian revenues 
formed thirty to forty percent of the total Ottoman budget.
144
  Furthermore, Ibn al-Athir stated on 
Nur-ad-Din’s campaign to Egypt, “Asad al-Din [the general of Nur-ad-Din’s campaign] should 
dwell among them with an army and that their financial support should also come from 
Egypt.”145  This statement indicates that the expansion aimed at covering the campaign’s costs 
and the soldiers’ payments.  A long season of expansion probably meant active campaigning, and 
this gave greater hopes of booty to offset expenditure.  The domination over trade routes between 
Egypt and Syria created an extensive mine for employment in commercial businesses, especially, 
in the absence of trade interruptions by the Crusaders and other Muslim ruling elites.   
                                                        
141
 Ibn al-Athir, The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 173.   
142
 Ibn al-Athir, The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 196-
198. 
143
 R. Ettinghausen, O. Grabar and M. Jenkins-Madina, Islamic Art and Architecture 650-
1250 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 187-200. 
144
 See Michael F. Hendy, Studies in The Byzantine Monetary Economy, C. 300-1450 
(NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 613-618. 
145
 Ibn al-Athir, The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. II. , 2010, 173.  
  69 
By suppressing the piracy and brigandage of other Muslim military leaders, Nur-ad-Din 
brought back to the Islamic world the extensive territorial dominions.  In addition, these 
expansions brought back into Nur-ad-Din’s institution large traces of lands with access to 
waterways trade, together with larger traces of inland territories with unlimited access to 
overland trade routes and communication.  It boosted the Levy and the self-sufficiently on the 
large estates, peace and war and, more importantly, the changing rule of the state with the 
development of the large territorial empires.
146
  As Nur-ad-Din’s empire expanded, mercantilism 
correspondingly expanded.  Indeed, from the first Arab-Islamic empire of the seventh-century to 
the Ottomans – the last great Islamic empire – the rise and fall of imperial mercantilism was the 
story of the Near East and perhaps even further, the story of the universe.
147
  Furthermore, 
psychologically, the military expansions were useful for all Muslims, since they represented a 
way of resolving the tension of the Islamic societies at the expense of other Atabegs and the 
Crusaders, rather than on the poor strata class.     
Nur-ad-Din’s state enjoyed strong and expanding urban networks, growing consumer 
demands, increasing range of manufacturing activities, and highly commercialized economy.
148
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More decisively, Nur-ad-Din used his military power to protect the trading business.
149
  In 
return, the nobility class contributed cash to Nur-ad-Din’s campaigns.  Ibn al-Athir stated on the 
campaign Nur-ad-Din’s campaign to Egypt, “they had been at Damietta, during which Saladin 
[Saladin was yet Nur-ad-Din’s general] expended untold sums of money. I was told that he said, 
‘I have never seen anyone more generous than al-Adid; [an Egyptian nobleman] during the time 
the Franks were before Damietta he sent me a million dinars, apart from clothes and other 
things.”150  Regardless of the exaggerated sum, it seems that the more prosperous Muslims in the 
upper class supported the imperial advances of Nur-ad-Din.  Concretely, how did the prosperous 
class benefit?  There is a total silence in the literary sources of this question, but rational 
economic goals, certainly, were among the motivations of their contributions and support.   
 On the other hand, the common people, the poorer strata, were both the driving force 
behind, and the beneficiaries of, the imperial growth.  At the head of the extensive list was the 
end of the Atabegs’ fiscal rights over land and trade.  Add to the work in farms and trade, the 
total cash benefits to poor Muslims, though not measurable, it was certainly there.
151
  Above all, 
the empire and its benefits brought back the centralization of power to the Islamic state.  To 
explain the last point, Nur-ad-Din’s state manipulated a disciplinary constitution that served a 
whole society.  More precisely, Nur-ad-Din’s institution of the state manipulated the use of force 
for rational economic objects.  Therefore, rational production and commercial politics triggered 
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the aims of power politics within Nur-ad-Din’s state.152  Beyond that, Nur-ad-Din’s expansions 
managed to tame Muslims’ military powers.  The expansion process provided regular payments 
for the military elites, this time from the accumulations of booty and tributes. Ibn al-Athir stated 
on Nur-ad-Din’s campaign to Egypt, “Nur al-Din gave every man with Asad al-Din twenty 
dinars as a bonus, not counted as part of his pay.”153  This point particularly marked Nur-ad-
Din’s success, because his campaigns administered the greatest military achievement to lock 
economic growth to his state, and in retrospect, to Muslim subjects. 
  To be sure, the Islamic world maintained a standing army before the impact of the First 
Crusade, and continued to do so.  After the end of expansions, the Islamic state failed to provide 
regular payments to the army.  Instead, it granted military officers the fiscal right to collect land 
revenues for their salaries.  Nonetheless, the Islamic state failed to control the power of the army 
throughout this process.  Similarly, the capstone structure of Nur-ad-Din’s army remained from 
the Turkic elites and the Atabegs, an organization designed to bring about professional and 
discipline warriors.
154
  Although there is no evidence of whether (or not) Muslim subjects chose 
to serve in Nur-ad-Din’s army physically, the later experience demonstrated that, without the 
imperial income, it was impossible to pay so large a body of soldiers regularly.  Fundamental 
measures require powerful stimuli and unprecedented necessary conditions.  Taking trade for 
example, Muslims succeeded to maintain imports and exports even after the foundation of the 
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Crusader States.
155
  Nonetheless, it seemed comprehensible to everyone that the imperial power 
guaranteed higher levels of those imports as a strong and united army supported and protected it.  
For example, Ibn al-Athir documented the account of two Muslim merchandise-ships set out 
from Egypt to Syria and anchored at the port of Lattakia.  There, the Franks ceased the ships and 
the merchandise.  In response, Nur-ad-Din conducted a military campaign towards the Frankish 
cities of Arqa and Tripoli until the Franks gave back the stolen goods.
156
  This decisive fact 
indicates that the empire granted safer and higher trade measures.  In retrospect, the imperial 
power provided both the necessary cash and the political means toward the practical warfare.
157
                 
Apart from acquisitions of property among Muslims in Nur-ad-Din’s empire, the imperial 
income enabled Nur-ad-Din to demonstrate the financial growth of his state without adding 
finical burden on Muslim subjects.  He used the income to construct splendid public buildings in 
the form of religious monuments as a part of his aim to revitalize Islam to stimulate popular 
approach to Jihad.  Such monuments – because their inscriptions often dated them precisely – 
provide an inevitable historical evidence of not only Nur-ad-Din’s popular temptation to the 
Islamic zeal, but also to the financial strength of his state.  Those colossal landmarks confirmed 
the popular image of Nur-ad-Din as the leader who stimulates his financial power for the good of 
Islam and the Muslims.  More precise, this noteworthy shift indicates the religious dimension, 
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which all chroniclers, though came from diverse cultures in the Islamic world and wrote from 
different perspectives, displayed on the image of Nur-ad-Din.
158
   
Furthermore, the patronage image and the religious dimension demonstrate how the 
religious class coated Nur-ad-Din’s movements with right intent.  This is not to reveal Nur-ad-
Din true intent.  Nonetheless, the gradual success of the imperial economy coated the power 
politics with an Islamic virtue.  Not only did it secure Muslims’ survival needs, but also it made 
the moral economy available.  As for the issue of the Second Crusade, Muslims overcame the 
probability of defeat, but a charismatic leader arose to stir his people into fighting.  The fight at 
this point seemed just in theory for at this point it required Muslims to fight for the state itself: 
the epitome of their identity.  In practical terms, the fight seemed possible for the power of an 
empire provided the necessary means for such large-scale military campaigns.    
One more facet to the ideological revival of justice in the time of Nur-ad-Din was his 
establishment of a ‘House of Justice’ in Damascus.  The timing of this particular building was 
not a coincident.  Certainly, this monument prevailed Nur-ad-Din’s popular temptations toward 
the religious atmosphere of counter-crusading.  Thus, in the House of Justice, Nur-ad-Din, or one 
of his appointed deputies, presided over sessions in which Muslim subjects brought their 
grievances to address them to the ruler.
159
  Ibn al-Athir went further to claim that Nur-ad-Din 
himself used to set in the House of Justice two days a week, with the judges and the legists to 
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listen to the people’s grievances.160  It seems that the continuous success of the empire gave 
Muslim subjects a sense of justice and made civil peace possible.  It is not a surprise that both 
chroniclers and inscriptions attributed the image of Nur-ad-Din to the ‘Just King’.161         
Sprinkling the Weberian terminology, the imperial growth reflected a sense of shared 
identity in the Islamic society.  This is not a surprise for Muslims’ memories preserved an 
idealistic image of the glorious past of the Islamic empire; and as soon as it seemed possible, 
Muslims determined to fight for it.  It is worth stressing that the Islamic empire was more to 
Muslims than a mere state, it was a holy and sovereign state: a community and a religion that 
once dominated the entire Middle East and an identity that marked Muslims’ success for 
centuries.  For that cause, the fight met the general population’s psychological need of justice 
and provided the reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight.  Moreover, 
Muslim subjects viewed Nur-ad-Din’s administration that created the so-called godly blessing 
wealth as a legitimate authority.  The issue of righteous intentions, therefore, coated the act of 
war.  Hence, the social solidarity brought Jihad’s religious theories together with the practices, 
because the power of a holy empire succeeded to unite the means, goals and efforts of its 
subjects for a common just cause.  Only under this term, the practical magnitude of Jihad turned 
from the preserve of the noble elites into a totally mainstream activity, accepted and endorsed by 
an entire society.  More accurately, it activates the practical concept of Jihad by the wide number 
of Muslim citizens who supported the wars.
162
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To be sure, this approach does not imply any temptation to label Nur-ad-Din’s 
expansions, ‘wartime measures.’  Although ambitious, it ignores the fact that the concept 
‘wartime measures’ involves numerous campaigns and consistent warfare.163  However, what 
this approach proposes is that such an aim was a direct result of dominating trade accumulations.  
Nur-ad-Din took that step in that direction as he was able and found it advantageous.  Short of 
going to war, there was no more useful instrument for punishing enemies, rewarding ‘friends’, 
and persuading ‘neutrals’ to become friends; and if employment of the instrument meant going to 
war, tant pis.  The rising imperial power implied that Nur-ad-Din could similarly control all 
independent Islamic provinces.
164
  Potentially, the growth of his territory meant higher tributes; 
and with the backing of flowing resources, the religious class, the subjects, and a strong 
formidable army, he could deny any and every province in the Near East access to important 
trade routes.   
Of course, Nur-ad-Din had the ability, but it is surly hard to determine whether the aim 
itself was (or was not) thinkable.  That is to commit the hegemony-into-empire once again.  This 
may explain the voluntary subjection of northern Syria.  Certainly, many Islamic provinces 
together with the Crusader States had comparable needs to import.  Nur-ad-Din, at this point, 
could block them partially if not completely.  Furthermore, in the absence of genuinely 
commercial and competitive motives, Nur-ad-Din restricted Muslims’ interference in the trading 
activities of one another, as those issues arose ad hoc in the growth of the empire.  Only after the 
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Second Crusade, which radically altered the scale of operations and the stakes, did it become 
necessary to make massive use of the trade-blocking instrument.  
Although the Crusader States, surely, suffered from the growing imperial power of Nur-
ad-Din, concretely, who in Nur-ad-Din’s state benefited (or suffered) from the empire, how and 
to what extent?  In what follows, this study shall remain within the narrow framework; to draw 
attentions to the way socioeconomic factors influenced the rise of counter-crusading 
movements.
165
  It is clear that Muslims combined the history of the Islamic empire with Islam 
itself.  Therefore, a Muslim piousness and willingness to submit and defend the holy empire 
made the embrace of an all-consuming Islamic identity an attractive alternative to the all-
encompassing socioeconomic factors of the Islamic empire.  Nonetheless, economic factors not 
only facilitated the act of war but also revived Muslims memories of the great Islamic empire.  
Consequently, Nur-ad-Din’s success minimized the distance between the glorious past and the 
actual present.  More accurately, it minimized the distance between Muslims’ shocking defeat of 
the First Crusade and their victory over the Second Crusade.   
It seems compelling that the empire directly profited Muslim general population to an 
extent known in the Islamic world through memory preservations of the great Islamic empire at 
the ages of the Omayyad and the early Abbasid.  There was a price, of course, the costs of 
constant warfare.  Men were lost in engagements, most shatteringly in the Second Crusade and 
thereafter.  Nonetheless, it seems possible to state that there is no direct connection between the 
empire and the theoretical Jihad for juries’ contribution to provide legal theories of Jihad existed 
well before and after the First and Second Crusades without any significant changes in the 
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methods.  This is not to deny that the power of the Islamic empire boosted juries’ motivation but 
rather to imply that juries’ contribution continued regardless of the material conditions of the 
empire.  On the other hand, the connection between the practical Jihad and the empire was 
obvious.  War was an endemic justice: everyone accepted that as a fact, and therefore no one 
seriously argued, or believed, that giving up the empire would relive Muslims of the miseries of 
war.  It would merely relieve them of certain particular wars, and the loss of the empire and its 
moral and material benefits did not seem worth that dubious gain.  
With the empire, Muslims morale remained buoyant to the end, reflecting their calculus 
of the moral and material profits and losses.  Repeatedly, this is not to imply that economic 
factors motivated Muslims’ holy war.  In any common sense, the imperial profit appeared 
gradually years after the impact of the Second Crusade.  The point is that the impact of the 
Second Crusade drove Muslims survival instinct to the level of necessity by which war became 
inescapable.  Then, Muslims victory over the Second Crusade convinced Muslims that they were 
fighting for a holy cause.  This step coupled with higher aspirations to bring back the great 
Islamic empire, which for centuries dominated the Near East, benefited all its citizens, and 
became affiliated to the very meaning of the definition ‘Muslims.’  To avoid definition’s 
contortions, the holy cause changed rapidly; and with each success, Muslims believed that they 
were on the right track for God blessed their cause.  Therefore, everyone tolerated the ideas of 
holy and just wars.    
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It is worth stressing at this point that there is no program of imperialism there, no theory, 
merely a reassertion of the universal medieval belief in the holy naturalness of domination.
166
  In 
Aristotle words:  
The free rules over the servile in one way, the male over the female in another, 
and the man over the child in yet another. All the partners possess the elements on 
the human mind, but they possess them in different ways. The slave does not have 
the faculty of deliberation at all. The female has it but in an indefinite form. The 
child has it but in an imperfect form.
167
 
The power of an empire boosted Muslims’ hopes and aspirations in their struggle against the 
crusaders.  Therefore, it was no surprise that the failure of the Second Crusade ushered in a 
period in which for the years following the Second Crusade Muslims’ morale was reflected in a 
high level under the leaderships of Nur-ad-Din.  Aspirations, gradually, went as high as 
Jerusalem itself.  After the death of Nur-ad-Din, al-Isfhani stated, “by the light of his 
discernment the just prince Nur-ad-Din Mahmud Ibn Zengi had known in his time about the 
conquest of Jerusalem after him.”168  This is not to admit that the return of Jerusalem to the 
Islamic dominion motivated Nur-ad-Din’s activities.  Though the religious class’s interpretations 
supported that approach, historians are free to make their ethical verdict.  However, the power of 
the empire, surely, boosted the expectations.              
Nur-ad-Din’s dominion was of course an abstraction of the Islamic world, and to 
appreciate the significance of this point, the label ‘empire’ referred to an actual political state, 
not label on a religious community, namely ‘Sunni State.’  Although he conquered the most 
formidable Shi’ite institution, the Fatimid, the ideology remained incessant.  Hillenbrand argued 
                                                        
166
 See Cary J. Nederman, "Nature, Sin and The Origins of Society," Journal of The 
History of Ideas 49, no. 1 (Jan. - Mar. 1988): 3-26. 
167
 Aristotle, Politics, 1.1260a. 
168
 Imad al-Din al-Isfhani, Sana al-Barq al-Shami, 314-315. 
  79 
that, the ideological enmity between the Shi’ite and the Sunni was deeply entrenched and in 
practice it was almost unthinkable for them to form a united Islamic front against the 
Crusaders.
169
  Despite the fact that sectarian divisions continued within Nur-ad-Din’s state, the 
sense of freedom emerged.  For centuries, scholars have exercised their minds in vain to find a 
workable definition of ‘freedom.’  This is not to add yet another attempt to the mountain of 
explanations, for in any normal sense, the term to be defined regarding each social perception to 
the antithesis of ‘un-freedom.’  The reason is that the rights recognized in a given society 
constitute a bundle of claims, privileges, powers, and immunities un-evenly distributed among 
the individual members, in other words, the unequal privileges of citizenship.  Though unequal, 
citizens shared the at least standard of privileges that shapes a common identity.    
For centuries under the imperial power, Muslim subjects shared the rights to survive, to 
subsist, to dominate, and to belong to a common community.  This strong and dominating 
community characterized the epitome of the definition ‘Muslims,’ namely the great Islamic 
Empire; and to avoid running into conceptual contortions, the concept ‘freedom’ there brought 
back both moral and material privileges to the concept ‘Muslims.’  Given the long traditions of 
the concept ‘Muslims,’ the freedom there provided Muslims with a shared sense of insurance 
from the mysterious future regardless of their sectarian, social, and cultural diversity because it 
combined the fulfillment of their worldly needs with the fulfillment of their religious obligations.  
Beyond that, it is surely hard to determine whether (or not) Nur-ad-Din’s motivations 
represented a moral leader of Jihad.  Looking back, historians are free to make their own moral 
judgments.  However, Nur-ad-Din imperial approach employed all the forms of material 
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exploitation that were available and possible in that society, and to the turbulent Muslims, his 
leadership provided very powerful motives to support his campaigns: hope, aspiration, honor, 
fear, general interest, and above all the sense of self-affiliation to a paramount holy and 
sovereign identity.  In Ibn Khladun’s words: 
The end of social solidarity is sovereignty.  This is because, as we have said 
before, it is solidarity, which makes men unite their efforts for common objects, 
defending themselves, and repulse or overcome the enemies.  We have also seen 
that every human society requires a restraint, and a chief who can keep men from 
injuring themselves.  Such a chief must command a powerful support, else he will 
not be able to carry out his restraining function.
170
 
                                  
The conclusion seems compelling.  The impact of Second Crusade created a state of 
general panic in Damascus, which then extended to all the surrounding Islamic major cities.  A 
single survival instinct pressed Muslims into alliance for the first time since the impact of the 
First Crusade.  The panic triggered a call for sovereignty; anyone at this point could call himself, 
God’s appointee on earth.  Experience and practical judgments determined the choices and the 
limits.  Nur-ad-Din was certainly fortunate that he started his career at this turning point.  The 
religious class continued to offer the theological call for the Jihad, which gave the religious 
dimension to Nur-ad-Din’s expansions.  His expansions, in return, brought back the empire 
institution with all its benefits.  Muslim subjects did nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to 
human practice, in accepting an empire when it was offered to them, and then in refusing to give 
it up.  After the Second Crusade, public opinion was reluctant to reverse itself once it has 
acknowledged the validity of an institution, the legitimacy of the practice and the exercise of 
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rights.  In the just war thinking, Muslims acknowledged the presence of the legitimate authority, 
legitimate cause, and right intent.   
As for the concept ‘Jihad’, Humphereys’ proposed that it is a plastic one, which can be 
deployed in widely varying ways for varying ends.
171
  Concretely, what Muslim actions reflected 
(or not) a true Jihad is imprecise.  Hence, it is better to leave this subject to each historian’s own 
moral tendency toward the argument.   However, it looks now as though notions of vengeance 
played a relatively minor part.  Perhaps vengeance existed in the Jihad’s theological approach, 
but the practices reflected a different cause, human’s survival instinct.  Materialism explanations 
may sound odd in correlation with religious issues, but how can one detach ideology from 
reality.  Ideologies are the products of the complicated human organizations.  That is something, 
but it is hardly enough to solve the puzzle.  Be that as it may, ideologies thrive only when they 
meet the practices.  To say this is not to deny the moral value of such ideology.  Jihad will 
always be an important individual duty to Muslims.  However, rotating the concept from an 
individual duty into a mass movement depends on the scale and the strength of the harmony 
between the human institution of the state and its subjects.  Nur-ad-Din re-drew his dominion on 
Muslims’ imperial inheritance, which for centuries institutionalized the important features of a 
community and its roles, more precise, the rule, the army and the general population. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
 It is a common place to state that the major issue that hindered Muslims from embracing 
Jihad in practical terms was the lack of adaptability, above all, what about the imperial state?  
Potentially, it was a decisive consideration in itself.  Its use was in the one process, production: a 
process of immense importance to society.  Every rational argument suggests quick and 
widespread adaption.  It would not be far wrong to say that from the seventh-century to the 
impact of the crusades, landed wealth represented the great wealth and revenue in the Islamic 
world, and that new wealth came majorly from wars and politics not from enterprise.  Therefore, 
the role of the Islamic state carried a massive transformation in the centuries following the 
massive Islamic expansions.  Materialistically, the expansions brought about all the interest of 
the imperial revenue.  Muslims claimed great quantities of land, improved and extended the 
public capital, supported arts and sciences.  Given the cessation of the expansions, Muslims did 
not develop new economic systems to use and innovate enterprise widely instead of wars.  
Consequently, this step transformed the role of the Islamic state once again.  This time, the 
transformation brought negative assessments on Muslim subjects.     
 The oral tradition of events in the Islamic world, however, presented only the moral 
benefits of the Islamic empire.  Islamic sources focused on the fact that the rise of the Islamic 
Empire was not simply an imperial conquest of the Near and Middle East; it was the creation, 
establishment, and spread of a new religion.  This line of argument mythologized the history of 
the Islamic empire and turned the imperial traditions into deep beliefs affiliated with the religion 
itself.  Given both approaches together, Muslims embraced Jihad practically, when the interest, 
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the available means, the domination, the necessary intellectual theories, and above all hopes and 
aspiration for salvation.  Muslims, however, carried all within one umbrella, the imperial power.  
Yet, the fact is that, though the Islamic empire continued to exist before and after the First 
Crusade, though the interest seemed to have been present and the necessary intellectual theories 
continued on, Muslims did not advance the practical Jihad.  A simple pointing out to alternative 
values cannot dismiss this question when one of those values was a very powerful desire for 
salvation that should meet the necessary means for the large-scale warfare.   
 However, in any common sense the Holy War is the attempt to bridge the gap between 
religious ideals and worldly violence, between morals and materials and between the theories 
and the practices.  This is to imply that religious theories and practical warfare were not 
autonomous aspects of the story; they were actually a two-headed coin.  There is no way to 
separate ideology from reality.  Unquestionably, it is hard to dispute the argument in this 
particular instance that Muslims were able to embrace Jihad without both the revival of 
economic life and the arrival of more settled social relations.  Like all generalizations, this one as 
well countered with exceptions.  This meant that such a broad statement demands some 
qualifications.  It does not amount to an adolescent acceptance of stated motivations, or to an 
attempt to evaluate religious thinking free of its social setting.  This rather meant that most 
Muslim participants committed themselves to Jihad with the impetus of a worldview that set a 
premium on their spiritual health and above all their chances of salvation.  The point is that for 
the majority of Muslim participants it is undeniable that Jihad proved to be a profoundly (though 
not obsessively) religious experience to express their worldviews.  Therefore, it would be naive 
to underestimate the obvious addition of the ‘right point’, which provide the rational 
qualifications for the Jihad.  This meant that at the ‘right point’ all participants’ diverse 
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worldviews share one paramount identity, high cause and goal, which add a cover of legitimacy 
on the act of war, regardless of the multi-motivations. 
 To begin a terminology, it seems persuasive that the relationship between the theoretical 
and practical fields of Jihad showed a great assimilating power, the power of imposing its 
spiritual ascendancy even when it could not control the material conditions.   For an active Jihad, 
however, a balance established itself between legal theories and legal practices and between 
morals and materials: an uneasy truce between Muslim juries on a side and the political 
authorities (the state) and Muslim subjects on the other side.  By applying this examination on 
the Islamic world between the First and Second Crusades, it appears compelling that Muslim 
juries provided consistent legal theories in both cases, regardless of the material conditions.  The 
aim of Muslim legists was, therefore, not to make wars, but rather to understand the nature of 
war, to tame it, and to promote it according to the necessity and the surrounding circumstances.  
The only significant point on the theoretical field came after the impact of the First Crusade 
when al-Sulami preached that provincial rulers did not require the Caliph authorization, perhaps 
concerned more by the desperate necessity rather than the legitimate one.  The practices, 
however, witnessed a noteworthy change after the impact of the disastrous Second Crusade.  
This, certainly, indicates that the Second Crusade resembled the ‘right point’ to the practical field 
of Jihad.  In return, it is obvious to state that the impact of Second Crusade was the ‘right point’ 
to the relationship between the human institution of the state and its Muslim subjects.                  
The second chapter stressed the power, prosperity and stability of the Islamic state 
throughout the foundation of the early Islamic Empire, and until the closing of the eighth-
century.  That empire was very different in a number of ways from the Islamic world at the age 
of the crusades, let alone conjures up image of marching armies, massive constructions, and 
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Arabic language.  None of these characterized the Islamic world when the First Crusade struck 
the Near East.  The striking forces of the Islamic world were now nomadic Turks.  Every 
superpower seeks the last innovation of super-weaponry; and the nomadic Turks were the best 
innovation.  Yet, arguably the indirect consequences were worse.  The stateless nature of the 
nomadic societies was a particular problem for the Muslims in that it was impossible to control 
them by diplomacy.  Such technique only works if there is an acknowledged leader with whom 
one can establish binding agreements.  No one of the Atabegs had that kind of lasting authority.   
Even so there is an underlying continuity behind its culture changes, and, despite 
fluctuation, it was still the Islamic Empire (Caliphate), and known as such to its citizens and 
enemies.  Certainly, its subjects still called themselves Muslims and referred to Baghdad as ‘the 
Caliph city.’  All make clear that the process of Muslims’ self-identification with the empire was 
a continued one: an admiration nostalgia that grew into a myth.  In reality, however, both the 
Islamic empire and the Caliph were merely memories.  Nonetheless, it was still the same empire, 
which had dominated the Near East from the seventh-century; this time it was in fragments.  
This, however, give some indications of a divided attitude between the past and the present.  
Muslims voluntarily exchanged the present sense of separateness for a sense of belonging to the 
much larger and much stronger community.  It seems possible to go further and to state that 
Muslims lived in a daydream state: a memory of an empire.  Therefore, to understand what 
qualifications made the impact of the Second Crusade, the ‘right point’ for the practical Jihad, it 
was important to shed the light on the social economic changes in the Islamic Empire.    
In the eighth century, Muslims, respectively, occupied far more territories.  Sending the 
population out and bringing in additional means in the form of booty and tributes could absorb a 
rising population.  Both, however, were stopgaps, not solutions, and to appreciate the 
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significance of this point, the term Muslims, in reality, changed over time from a label of an 
actual politic, religion, and economic unite (the empire) into abstractions, not labels on actual 
political state.  They were merely the consequences of population outstripping the available 
means.  The use of slaves created a new relative class in the Islamic world, and reordered the 
pre-existing social classes.  Certainly, this reordering brought negative assessments on the 
general population.  The pursuit of limited resources brought internal warfare to the Islamic 
world.  Private capital, it is true, promotes and operates many of the possible innovations.  
This, however, was not the case.  There were enough individuals who possessed the 
resources, but not among the men whose interest lay in production.  Add to the list the land-
hunger of the Atabegs, which depopulated the productive rural areas at the expense of 
overpopulating the Islamic cities.  The wide gap between production and consumption, surely, 
led to inflation.  All these factors transformed the function of the Islamic state from serving a 
whole community to serving individual Atabegs’ ideologies.  Living in a state of social 
disorientation, Muslim subjects could not find a way to serve the state.  These facts marginalized 
Muslim subjects and kept them from participating in politics and wars.  Though disoriented, 
Muslims could not bridge the gap between the myth of Islamic empire and the reality that this 
empire was no longer a superpower.     
Therefore, the first qualification for the impact of the Second Crusade over the First is, 
certainly, the psychological element.  Although the impact of the First Crusade was not a 
surprise, Muslims seemed to have underestimated the crusader forces.  Thus, Muslims’ 
humiliating defeat had evidently dealt a blow to the cause of Jihad in the Islamic world.  
Probably, the cumulative effect of centuries of literary and architectural recordings of the 
glorious Islamic empire had contributed to a widespread Muslim belief that God approved their 
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domination and that they would always be victorious.  Hence, when the First Crusade defeated 
the Muslims so dismally, Muslim morals plummeted too.  It seems certain that the defeat had an 
impact upon Muslims’ enthusiasm toward Jihad, notwithstanding repeated vocations in support 
of waging the holy war without any practical response.  As Muslim subjects absorbed the 
outcome of the defeat, Muslim leaders ignored the fact.  Such feelings contributed to modus 
vivendi with the crusaders; and while both Muslim leaders and subjects accepted the Crusader 
States as a reality, the impact of the Second Crusade re-stir the struggle once again.  This time, 
Muslims over-estimated the campaign.  The call for Jihad was fundamental.  Armies from 
allover the Syrian provinces answered the appeal.  Hence, Muslims’ victory over the vast 
campaign demythologized the invincibility of the crusaders and re-bridged the gap between the 
myth of the Islamic empire and the victorious reality.        
The second qualification is the hegemony on Damascus.  Although Damascus had no 
such a religious significance to Muslims like Jerusalem, the impact escalated the counter-
crusading movements.  In Hillenbrand words, “Jerusalem always had its political price so long as 
the Franks still desired to possess it.”172  Perhaps for Jerusalem denoted a religious significant, 
but it was not a case of surviving necessity to the general population.  By contrast, Damascus 
implied a survival necessity to Muslims from the Damascenes, let alone, Damascus’ religious 
significance as the Omayyad’s city.  It is worth stressing that Muslims survived the Second 
Crusade by drawing on their imperial inheritance.  One aspect of that inheritance was the site of 
the former imperial capital (Damascus), and the land-walls built in the eighth-century.  
Nonetheless, the aggression on Damascus made it obvious to Muslims that neither Jerusalem nor 
the Holy Land was the center of their conflict with the crusaders, but rather, their own very 
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existence.  Therefore, Muslims – regardless of their sectarian, political and ideological 
differences – shared a survival instinct.  Muslims were now battling for their very survival, and 
to do so they would have to adapt, but equally they could only survive by drawing on their 
imperial inheritance built up over centuries. 
The third qualification stood in the formalistic league of Muslim provinces.  This step 
reflected the strength of the appeal to oust the crusaders.  Muslims had not called for a united 
Islamic force since the impact of the First Crusade.  This specific step characterized the prime of 
the turning point.  Indeed, the extent of fear from further crusades justified the leagues’ 
hegemony on other Muslim leaders who refused to join the league.  Although the impact of the 
Second Crusade provided a short momentum for the revival of Muslims’ sense of Jihad, the 
gradual transformation of the league into an empire kept the momentum alive.  Defeating the 
Second Crusade probably meant to Muslims that they were fighting for God’s cause in that 
particular battle.  However, the steady economic success followed Nur-ad-Din’s expansions 
confirmed that message.  Nur-ad-Din’s reoccupation of the Islamic lands revitalized Muslims 
memories of the previous Islamic empire, which by the standards of the pre-industrial world was 
a powerful, well-organized and wealthy state.  It had survived two centuries of political, cultural, 
administrative, social and economical crisis.  Driven back into Egypt, Palestine and Syria, the 
empire could be again a great power.  By the at least psychological standards, this step was 
enough to fuel hope and aspiration into Muslims. 
The issue of the identity is, of course, the fourth qualification.  Tracing Muslim sources, 
Muslims resented their identity variance with one another including the crusaders after the First 
Crusade.  The analysis of Muslim sources of the First Crusade, though, it put them all at odd 
with one another, every single chronicler identified the self and the community to which he 
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belonged as ‘Muslims.’  That was not a surprise, but rather it was the inheritance of, first, 
centuries of a community that once dominated the Near East, second, two centuries of social and 
cultural crisis followed the gradual cession of the role of the state and the lack of adaptability.  
By contrast, it seems convincing from the massive harmony in Muslim sources that the impact of 
the Second Crusade reshaped Muslims identity.  It spurred higher hopes and expectations among 
Muslims to bring back the great Islamic empire with all its spiritual and material meanings.  This 
time, Muslims resented only their variance with the Franks; and to avoid definition contortions, 
the concept ‘Muslims’ meant the community of people who belonged to the superpower of the 
Near East.  Muslims used this identity to differentiate themselves from Latin Christendom.  
Taking the Greeks as an analogous example, for centuries the Greeks resembled their variance 
with one another.  Only after the massive Persian invasion when the definition ‘Greek’ defined 
all inhabitants of the Greek’s main lands: and it simply meant the super-strong community that 
defeated the Persians.173  This step, in return, provided Muslims with one paramount identity to 
fight, for it united the state’s administration and the subjects into the struggle with the crusaders. 
Beyond the process of simply getting the qualifications for the necessary force of men 
stands the formidable logistic problem of Jihad’s necessity.  This quest meant to explain whether 
(or not) Muslims’ practical warfare implied a necessity for the constant hegemony against the 
Crusaders after defeating the Second Crusade.  To answer this point, it is worth stressing the 
situation of the Crusader States after the Second Crusade.  Certainly, the Crusader States suffered 
a major downfall without any further Islamic military campaigns.  In the forty years followed the 
Second Crusade, the Crusader States underwent internal warfare, disintegration and above all 
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 Ernle Bradford, Thermopylae: The Battle for The West (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 
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economical crisis.174  This was the obvious result to Nur-ad-Din’s domination over the Near 
East’s fertile crescent (Egypt and Syria) and its trade routes.  Without these prospects, the 
Crusader States increasingly decayed.  Thus, Nur-ad-Din now forced the Crusader States to 
battle for its own survival, without neither Islamic military campaigns nor any Latin assistance 
from the West.  According to Islamic legal theories of the Jihad, this step indicates that resort to 
war followed an attempt to pursue legitimate goals by nonlethal means.175  It seems possible to 
state that in this particular case, the theory met the practice.  This is neither to imply a moral 
judgment regarding Nur-ad-Din’s intentions nor any temptations to center the Jihad ideology on 
peace.  Instead, it explains the existence of the just war procedures, which brought about almost 
all Muslims into the struggle.    
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175
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